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ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER THE SECURITIES
LAWS AFTER ERNST & ERNST v. HOCHFELDER
by David B., Parker*
I.

INTRODUCTION

While the role of legal counsel in the operation of federal securities
regulations has always been pervasive and indispensable, 1 in the forty
years since the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933 Act)2
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act) 3 there has
been a dramatic increase in the attorney's involvement and influence
in this area. It is the responsibility of attorneys to guide the corporate
client through the intricate maze of the 1933 Act regulations governing
the registration requirements4 for the issuance of securities, and to
facilitate the sale of securities by registration or exemption through
opinion letters, and drafting of disclosure documents, primarily the
* B.A., 1972 (University of California, Los Angeles); J.D., 1976 (University of
California, Los Angeles). Member, State Bar of California.
1. See generally Douglas, The Lawyer and the Federal Securities Act, 3 DuKE BAR
Ass'N J. 166 (1935); Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1305
(1934); Isaacs, Liability of the Lawyer for Bad Advice, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 39 (1935);
Kennedy & O'Donnell, Practice of Law Before the Securities and Exchange Commission,
6 J.MAR. L.Q. 244 (1940); Stone, The Public Influence of the Bar, 48 Harv. L. Rev.
1 (1934).
2. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970), as amended by 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77a-77aa (Supp. V 1975) (the 1933 Act).
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78hh-1 (1970), as amended by
15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (Supp. V 1975) (the 1934 Act). The focus of this article
will be on the application of the 1933 and 1934 Acts to the responsibilities and liabilities
of attorneys in the field of securities law.
4. "Registration requirements" refer generally to the prohibition against the sale or
the offer for sale of securities not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission pursuant to the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77e-77h (1970). The scope of the registration requirements is set forth in sections 2 and 3 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
77b-77c (1970).
5. Commissioner Sommer succinctly described the importance of an attorney opinion
to the success of a proposed securities transaction: "In a word, . . . the professional
judgment of the attorney is often the 'passkey' to securities transactions. If he gives
an opinion that an exemption is available, securities get sold; if he doesn't give the
opinion, they don't get sold." Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities
Lawyer, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,631 (Jan. 24,
1974) (speech before Banking, Corporation and Business Law Section of the New York
State Bar Association) [hereinafter cited as Sommer]. In terms of the effect of counsel's opinion on the investing public, the court in United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d
854 (2d Cir. 1964) observed: "In our complex society the accountant's certificate and
the lawyer's opinion can be instruments for inflicting pecuniary loss more potent than
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registration statement.6 No less pivotal is the role of corporate legal
counsel in the functioning of the continuous disclosure process established by the 1934 Act, including proxy solicitation statements, 7 disclosure documents pertaining to takeover bids,8 and annual report filings.9
Yet; remarkably, despite these immense responsibilities which have
come to rest on the shoulders of the legal profession, the 1933 Act and

1934 Act are virtually silent with respect to the accountability of attorneys to the investing public. 10 By contrast, the Acts do establish a
rigorous pattern of regulation for other professions involved in the securities markets, including corporate officers and directors,1" control
persons,12 broker-dealers,' 3 underwriters,14 investment advisers,", exthe chisel or the crowbar." Id. at 863.
6. On the attorney's role in developing the registration statement, it has been said:
mhe registration statement has always been a lawyer's document and with very,
very rare exceptions the attorney has been the field marshall who coordinated the
activities of others engaged in the registration process, wrote (or at least rewrote)
most of the statement, made the judgments with regard to the inclusion or exclusion
of information on the grounds of materiality, compliance with registration form requirements, necessities of avoiding omission of disclosure necessary to make those
matters stated not misleading. . . . With the exception of the financial statements,
virtually everything else in the registration statement bears the imprint of counsel.
Sommer, supra note 5.
7. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970).
8. Id. § 14(d)-14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(e) (1970).
9. Id. § 13, 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
10. See Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49
N.Y.U.L. REv. 437, 463 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lipman]; Shipman, The Need for
SEC Rules to Govern the Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal
Securities Statutes, 34 OHIO ST. L.J. 231, 235, 266, 279 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Shipman]; Small, An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities
Laws: Private Counselor or Public Servant?, 61 CALIF. L. Rav. 1189, 1192, 1206, 1218
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Small].
11. E.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 1l(a)(1)-(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(1)-(3) (1970)
(misleading registration statement); Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 14, 15 U.S.C.
§78n (1970) (proxies); id. § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1970) (insider trading). See generally W. KNEPPER, LIABILrIy OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DmRECroRS (2d ed. 1973)
[hereinafter cited as KNEPPER].
12. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1970); Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 § 20, 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1970).
13. Securities Act of 1933 § 4(3)-4(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77(d)(3)-(4) (1970) (liability
for violations of registration provisions of the Act and fraud in the sale of securities);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 8H 5, 8-13, 15, 17, 15 U.S.C. H§ 78e, 78h-78m, 78o,
78q (1970 & Supp. V 1975), and pertinent Commission rules promulgated thereunder.
See generally KNEPPER, supra note 11, at 315-40.
14. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(5) (1970). See, e.g.,
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 425 U.S.
929 (1976).
15. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. H8 80b-1-80b-21 (1970 & Supp. V

1975).
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perts such as engineers and appraisers,' and accountants.- 7

There have been attorneys whose conduct involving securities has
departed from professional standards of competency and ethics or
whose conduct has involved blatantly unlawful schemes.

At times

they have acted strictly as professionals, while more frequently their
status as attorneys has been incidental to their role as principals in

violation of the securities laws. Yet, regardless of the degree of misconduct or the capacity in which attorneys have acted, the injurious consequences have been significant. In few other fields of business or law
are the acts of so few individuals able to cause financial losses for so
many persons. It has required no prophetic insight to foresee that at-

torneys would increasingly be the target of criminal and injunctive
actions by the government and civil damage actions by private investors.

The great difficulty has been to adapt the federal securities laws to
fairly and clearly define the responsibilities of attorneys to the public.

Measures of accountability capable of deterring abuses by attorneys and
capable of providing compensation for damages have also been a difficult objective.
Traditionally, the courts have passively accepted the omissions in the
1933 Act and 1934 Act relating to the liabilities of attorneys.

For-

merly, sanctions were imposed only in those instances where attorneys
acted as principals in fraudulent schemes' or occupied a non-legal role

such as an officer or director of an issuer.' 9 Until recently, this view
16. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970). See notes
365-83 infra and accompanying text.
17. Securities Act of 1933, § 11(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4) (1970); Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 § 14(a), 17(a), 18, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a), 78q(a), 78r (1970
& Supp. V 1975). For the subject of accountant liability, see references cited in KNEPPER, supra note 11, at 283; Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud
Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy, "In Pari Delicto," Indemnification and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 597, 613 n.65 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Ruder].
18. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972)
(on same facts, see SEC v. Ezrine, [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972)); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953
(1964); United States v. Schwartz, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
93,023 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Gottlief v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980
(CCH)
(E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd, 452 F.2d 510 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 938 (1971); SEC
v. A.G. Bellin Sec. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Cf. United States v.
Sarantos, 455 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1972) (involving a scheme to defraud the Immigration
and Naturalization Service). See generally Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities
of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 CoLuM. L. REV. 412, 413-18 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Lowenfels].
19. See, e.g., SEC v. American Associated Systems, Inc., 482 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338
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was also reflected in the administrative decisions of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the SEC or the Commission).2" By contrast,
where attorneys functioned solely within the scope of their professional
role and did not personally engage in fraudulent activity-regardless
of the intimacy of their involvement-sanctions were not imposed. 21
The modern trend has been to recognize the pivotal role of attorneys
in facilitating the fraudulent schemes of the corporate principals and
to discard the talismanic immunity of the lawyer qua lawyer. Stressing
the remedial purposes of securities legislation, courts have recently
broadened the scope of potential attorney liability by expansive interpretation of the 1933 Act, most notably the "seller" requirement of
section 12,22 and by the creative development of the most influential
antifraud provision of the securities acts, section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (section 10(b)) 28 and rule 10b-5, 24 through the
concepts of "duty" 25 and aiding and abetting.26 The moving force behind this "quiet revolution 2 7 in the development of the responsibilities
and liabilities of attorneys under the securities laws has been the SEC.28
(5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1974); Wall v. United States, 384 F.2d
758 (10th Cir. 1967); United States v. Crosby, 294 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1961), cert.
denied sub nom. Mittleman v. United States, 368 U.S. 984 (1962); Blakely v. Lisac,
357 F. Supp. 255 (D. Ore. 1972); SEC v. National Bankers Life Ins. Co., 334 F. Supp.
444 (S.D. Tex.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1971); Felt v. Leasco Data Processing
Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); SEC v. Fifth Ave Coach Lines,
Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd, 435 F.2d 510 (2d Cir. 1970); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
20. See, e.g., Marshall I. Stewart, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 4829 (Apr. 29, 1966);
Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 SEC 347 (1960), modified, 40 SEC 459 (1961). See Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 414-16.
21. See, e.g., Nicewarner v. Bleavins, 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965); Wonneman
v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
91,034
(S.D.N.Y. 1961).
22. Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970). For a discussion of attorney
liability under section 12, see notes 284-364 infra and accompanying text.
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 10(b)].
24. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), promulgated under section 10(b), supra note 23
[hereinafter cited as rule lob-5].
25. The concept of "duty" is examined in notes 119-85 infra and accompanying text.
26. For a discussion of the development of aiding and abetting liability, see notes
94-118 infra and accompanying text.
27. See Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 412.
28. The SEC's role has been much discussed:
During the last few years the traditional view of the securities lawyers' responsibilities and duties ... has been eroded by the SEC and, to a lesser degree, by
the federal courts. No longer are sanctions and liabilities reserved for securities
lawyers who are active participants or prime movers in blatant frauds. No longer
is it clear that the securities lawyer owes his first and primary allegiance to his
client. Today the SEC is initiating complaints against lawyers qua lawyers, and
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This article will examine the more significant trends in the liability
of attorneys under the federal securities laws in light of the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Eenst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,29 which adopted
a scienter standard and precluded negligence as a basis for liability in
private damage actions under section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5.

H.

ERNST & ERNST V. HOCHFELDER

The United States Supreme Court's silence and non-involvement in
the critical issues of professional liability under the federal securities
laws has been notable. 30 While the history of high court pronouncewill seek to discipline securities counsel who the agency feels are not fulfilling their
responsibilities as professionals. Moreover, the Commission is now asserting that
the securities attorney has a duty to the investing public that in certain instances
may supercede the traditional duty owed to his own client. This position is manifested in recent SEC complaints, in SEC administrative decisions and in public
statements by SEC commissioners.
Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 418-19. For public statements by spokesmen for the Commission, see, e.g., id. at 427; Sommer, supra note 5; Sommer, The Commission and the
Bar: Forty Good Years, 30 Bus. LAw. 5 (1974); Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. REv. 1
(1973).
Recent Commission enforcement actions include SEC v. Allegheny Beverage Corp.,
No. 73-984 (D.D.C., filed May 11, 1973); SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp.,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,804 (2d Cir: 1976); SEC v. R.D. Philpot
Indus., Inc., No. 75-543 (S.D.N.Y., filed Feb. 5, 1973); SEC v. Everest Management
Corp., No. 71-4932 (S.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 11, 1971). For a discussion of these cases,
see Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 419-23. For other examples, see cases cited in
Mathews, Liabilities of Lawyers Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 30 Bus. LAw. 105,
136-38 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Mathews].
For some examples of administrative decisions by the Commission, see Emanuel
Fields, SEC 1933 Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973); Murray A. Kivitz, SEC 1933
Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), rev'd, Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir.
1973).
29. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
30. Civil damage cases presenting the issue of scienter under section 10(b) for which
a hearing was denied by the Supreme Court include Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351
(10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974); Landy v. FDIC,
486 F.2d 139 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974); SEC. v. First Sec.
Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1972); City Nat'l Bank v.
Vanderboon, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970); Globus v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, .390 U.S. 951 (1968); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811, reh. denied, 382 U.S. 933 (1965). See also Mader v. Armel,
461 F.2d 1123 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1023 (1972); Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
The Supreme Court has also declined review of the scienter issue in the context of
Commission enforcement actions for injunctive relief. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493
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ments on other issues in the area of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 has
indicated a trend toward an expansive and flexible reading of the antifraud provision,' in 1975 the Court took the first significant step to
limit the scope of rule 10b-5 by recognition of the purchaser-seller re2
quirement for standing in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores.1
Thus, there was cause for intense interest and speculation when the
Court granted a hearing to review the much publicized Seventh Circuit
ruling in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst3 which held that an accounting
firm's negligent failure in the course of its audits to discover a brokerage firm's fraudulent scheme was grounds for aiding and abetting liability in a private action for damages under section 10(b).34
The plaintiffs in Hochfelder were victims of a fraudulent securities
scheme perpetrated by Leston B. Nay, president of First Securities
Company of Chicago, a small brokerage firm. Between 1942 and 1966,
with the majority of transactions occurring in the 1950's, Nay induced
plaintiffs to invest funds in "escrow" accounts which he personally
represented would yield a high rate of return. This scheme required
investors to draw personal checks payable to Nay or a designated
bank for his account with the monies being immediately converted
by Nay. The fraud was eventually uncovered in 1968 when Nay
committed suicide, leaving a confessional note.35
Plaintiffs initiated an action for damages against Ernst & Ernst, a
national accounting firm retained by First Securities to perform periodic
audits and to file the annual reports required of registered brokers
under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act.'
As described by the Supreme
Court,
F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975); SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005,
reh. denied, 404 U.S. 1064 (1971).
31. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6 (1971); SEC v. National
Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
32. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
33. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
34. See notes 39-55 infra and accompanying text.
35. The fraud is described in detail in SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981 (7th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880 (1973), a case involving receivership proceedings
commenced by the Commission against the Nay brokerage firm, shortly after Nay's
death. Section 10(b) claims for relief against First Securities for having aided and
abetted Nay's fraudulent scheme "were sustained. The liability of the accounting firm
was not considered in that case.
36. The first count of the complaint charged the Midwestern Stock Exchange, of
which First Securities was a member firm, with complicity for having breached its duty
of supervision over the conduct of its members. Summary judgment in favor of the
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[t]he complaint charged that Nay's escrow scheme violated § 10(b) and
Commission Rule 10b-5, and that Ernst & Ernst had "aided and
abetted" Nay's violations by its "failure" to conduct proper audits of
First Securities. As revealed through discovery, respondents' cause of
action rested on a theory of negligent nonfeasance. The premise was
that Ernst & Ernst had failed to utilize "appropriate auditing procedures"
discover internal pracin its audits of First Securities, thereby failing to 37
tices of the firm said to prevent an effective audit.
The district court rejected Ernst & Ernst's contention that a cause of
action for aiding and abetting a securities fraud would not lie under
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 for alleged negligent misfeasance. However, the court granted the accounting firm's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the evidence clearly established that Ernst
& Ernst had adhered to generally accepted auditing standards and, ac38
cordingly, was blameless for failing to discover the fraud.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reversed the summary
judgment in favor of Ernst & Ernst, finding genuine triable issues of
fact with respect to whether the accounting firm complied with its duty
to conduct a proper audit in accordance with prevailing professional
standards3 9 and whether such compliance would likely have led to discovery of the fraud. 0
Ernst & Ernst's first line of defense, which ultimately prevailed with
the Supreme Court, was that it could not be held liable in damages for
aiding and abetting a third party's violation of section 10(b) and rule
1Ob-5, absent an allegation that it knew of the other's improper conduct.41 Relying on its earlier statements in Hochfelder v. Midwest
Stock Exchange,42 the court of appeals held that a claim for aiding and
abetting solely by inaction can be maintained under rule lOb-5 by
showing
that the party charged with aiding and abetting had knowledge of or,
but for a breach of duty of inquiry, should have had knowledge of the
Exchange was affirmed on appeal. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
37. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 190 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
38. The district court also held the action barred by the doctrine of equitable estoppel
and the Illinois three-year statute of limitations. These alternative findings were reversed by the court of appeals. 503 F.2d at 1115-19. The issue, of course, is mooted
by the Supreme Court's dismissal of the action without remand. See 425 U.S. 185,
193 n.11.
39. 503 F.2d at 1107-11.
40. Id. at 1115.
41. Id. at 1104.
42. 503 F.2d 364. See note 36 supra.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

to act due
fraud, and that possessing such knowledge the party failed
43
to an improper motive or breach of a duty of disclosure.
The court continued:
The foregoing elements comprise a flexible standard of liability which
should be amplified according to the peculiarities of each case. Accordingly, where, as here, it is urged that the defendant through action as
well as inaction has facilitated the fraud of another, a claim for aiding
and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that the defendant had
a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was the beneficiary of that duty of
inquiry; (3) the defendant breached that duty of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry the defendant breached a
duty of disclosure; and (5) there is a causal connection between the
breach of duty of inquiry and disclosure and the facilitation of the
underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry and subsequent disclosure
would44 have led to the discovery of the underlying fraud or its prevention.
Insofar as the court of appeals' decision recognized liability in
damages under rule IOb-5 for negligent breach of a duty of inquiry and
disclosure, it is now overruled.45
Since plaintiffs had disclaimed scienter on the part of Ernst & Ernst,
the court of appeals was faced with the issue of whether a duty of inquiry
and a concomitant duty of disclosure46 existed and, if so, whether plaintiffs belonged to the class of persons to whom these duties were owed.
Two sources for the accounting firm's duty of inquiry were considered: (1) the common law duty arising from the contractual undertaking to audit,47 and (2) a statutory duty of inquiry predicated on section 17(a) of the 1934 Act 48 and rule 17a-5, promulgated by the Commission. 49 The scope of the common law duty of inquiry was held not
to extend to the defrauded investors for two reasons. First, absence
of foreseeability precluded an action on the auditing contract itself. 0
Second, a tort action, arising out of the contractual arrangement and
based on a duty of inquiry extending to those not foreseeable 5 ' was
43. 503 F.2d at 1104 (citing Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d at 364).
44. 503 F.2d at 1104.

45. See notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text.
46. 503 F.2d at 1104-05.
47. Id.

48. A duty of disclosure was seen as arising inevitably from a breach of the duty
to conduct a proper audit pursuant to section 17(a) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a)
(1970). 503 F.2d at 1114.
49. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976). See 503 F.2d at 1104-05.
50. 503 F.2d at 1105.
51. Judge Cardozo's decision in the seminal case of Ultramares Corp. v. Touche,
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precluded because the defrauded investors were not "members of a
limited class whose reliance on the financial statements [was] specifi'52

cally foreseen.
The statutory duty of inquiry is mandated by the requirement that
a section 17(a) audit be conducted "in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards '53 which encompass a duty to review "internal accounting control."54 It is therefore incumbent on the accountant
to inquire as to the existence and nature of internal accounting control.
With respect to this duty of inquiry, however, the court of appeals held
that the plaintiffs were indeed beneficiaries with standing to assert a

claim for damages against a negligent accounting firm for conduct inconsistent with requisite standards of section 17(a):
Without reaching the question of whether there is implicit in Section
17(a) a direct duty flowing to the plaintiffs, it is enough for purposes
of proving defendant's aid and abetment of a ,Rule lOb-5 violation that
the extant duty of inquiry imposed on Ernst & Ernst is grounded on a
concern for the protection of investors such as the plaintiffs. 55

The court of appeals reversed and remanded for trial to determine
whether Ernst & Ernst, in fact, breached a duty to plaintiffs by failing to follow section 17(a) standards.
In the view of the Supreme Court, the issue to be decided was much
broader than the secondary liability of independent accountants under

section 10(b). As framed by Justice Powell, 56 the question was
"whether an action for civil damages may lie under § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . and . . . Rule 10b-5 . . . in
the absence of an allegation of intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud
on the part of the defendant."5 7
174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931), concerning the expansion of liability beyond privity limitations, is extensively discussed in the Seventh Circuit's Hochfelder opinion. 503 F.2d
at 1106-07.
52. 503 F.2d at 1107. The court of appeals also noted that plaintiffs' conceded failure
to rely on the statements prepared and certified by Ernst & Ernst was an independent
basis for finding no duty of disclosure owed to the defrauded investors. Id. See McLean v. Alexander, [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) g 95,725 (D. Del. 1976).
53. 503 F.2d at 1108.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1105. Plaintiffs also soughit to raise a new and distinct claim based on
the "direct duty" under section 17(a) and rule 17a-5 for the first time before the Supreme Court. This was done in anticipation of possible imposition of the scienter requirement on secondary liability. The Supreme Court refused to consider the question
in view of plaintiffs' failure to timely amend their complaint to state such a claim.
425 U.S. 185, 194 n.13.
56. Justice Powell wrote for a majority of six justices. 425 U.S. at 187. Justices
Blackmun and Brennan dissented. Id. at 215. Justice Stevens did not participate. Id.
57. Id. at 187-88 (citations omitted).
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The Court's decision in Hochfelder resolved the long-standing

debate among courts58 and commentators"0 as to whether a cause of
action under Rule 1Ob-5 requires an allegation of "scienter" or whether,
in some circumstances, mere negligence will suffice as a basis for liability.
The Court held that section 10(b), and, by extension, rule 1Ob-510 require proof of "scienter," i.e., "knowing and intentional" conduct or,
at the very least, something more than mere negligence. 01
The body of the Court's opinion was devoted to a point-by-point
rebuttal to the arguments of the SEC in its amicus brief. The Court

found support for the requirement of scienter in the language"2 and legislative history 3 of section 10(b), as well as in its0 relationship
with the
4
other substantive provisions of the securities acts.
58. Compare Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973);
Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 286-88 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972); with White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724,
734-35 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 930 U.S. 951 (1968).
59. See, e.g., Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Mann]; Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The Second Round: Privity and
State of Mind in Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sale Cases, 63 Nw. U.L. REV. 423 (1968);
Note, Scienter and Rule 10b-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969); Comment, Scienter in
PrivateDamage Actions Under Rule 10b-5, 57 GEo. L.. 1108 (1969); Comment, Negligent MisrepresentationsUnder Rule 10b-5, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 824 (1965); Comment,
Civil Liability Under Section 10B and Rule JOB-5: A Suggestion for Replacing the
Doctrine of Privity, 74 YALE L.J. 658 (1965).
60. The Court interpreted the language and administrative history of rule lob-5 as
consistent with the scienter requirement of its statutory source, section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A contrary interpretation would involve an overextension of the Commission's delegated authority. 425 U.S. at 213-14.
61. Id. at 201.
62. Placing great emphasis on the key terms, "manipulative," "device," "contrivance,"
which the Court found to evince an "unmistakeable . . . congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct quite different from negligence," id. at 199, and contrasting
this with the language of sections 11 and 12 of the 1933 Act, which evidence an unmistakeable intent to expressly proscribe conduct not involving scienter, the Court rejected the SEC's "effect-oriented" approach which would extend inevitably to strict liability. Id. at 198.
63. While acknowledging the scant legislative history from which section 10(b)
emerged, the Court did not find in the statements of the drafters or the published legislative reports any evidence which would contradict the clear import of the statutory
language. Id. at 201-11.
64. The Court stated:
We also consider it significant that each of the express civil remedies in the 1933
Act allowing recovery for negligent conduct, see §§ 11, 12(2), 15, . . . is subject
to significant procedural restrictions not applicable under § 10(b). . . . We think
these procedural limitations indicate that the judicially created private damage
remedy under § 10(b)-which has no comparable restrictions-cannot be ex-
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III.

IMPLICATIONS OF

A.

Hochfelder

Generally

The Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder, the most significant
interpretation thus far of rule 1Ob-5, which itself has exerted the greatest influence on the course of securities law since 1933, is certain to
have a profound effect on the liabilities of attorneys and other professionals. It is clear that an attorney will not be liable in damages to
a purchaser or seller of securities under section 10(b) for mere negligence. Beyond this, many significant questions remain to be answered:
What is the scope and meaning of "scienter?" Under what circumstances, if any, will recklessness suffice for liability in damages for
a violation of rule 1Ob-5? Is good faith a defense under all circumstances? What will be the implications of the increasing resort to aiding and abetting liability? What impact will Hochfelder have on the
concepts of duty and scope of duty, as distinguished from culpability
or standard of conduct? Does the scienter requirement for civil damage actions apply to equitable relief in private actions and in SEC enforcement proceedings? Finally, what is the scope of potential attorney
liability under other statutory provisions which do not require proof of
scienter?
B.

Meaning of "Scienter"

Although the Supreme Court unequivocally rejected the "flexible
duty standard" of White v. Abrams 5 and the Seventh Circuit's opinion
in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst,66 insofar as the court of appeals recognized negligence as a possible basis for rule lOb-5 liability in private
damage actions and established a "scienter" requirement, the question
remains: What is meant by the term "scienter?" 7 While the continuum of culpable conduct between negligence and specific intent to
deceive is complex, 8 the primary inquiry as to "scienter" must be
directed to the concept of recklessness.
tended, consistently with the intent of Congress, to actions premised on negligent
wrongdoing. Such extension would allow causes of action covered by § 11, § 12(2)
and § 15 to be brought instead under § 10(b) and thereby nullify the effectiveness
of the carefully drawn procedural restrictions on these express actions.
Id. at 208-10 (footnotes and citations omitted).
65. 495 F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1974). This rule is discussed in note 84 infra.
66. 503 F.2d at 1104.
67. Some have urged that the term be discarded. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 728 n.3 (1974).

68. See Mann, supra .note 59.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

The Court carefully limited the scope of its ruling in defining the
degree of culpability which is included, if not required, to establish
scienter under section 10(b):
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law
recklessness is considered to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of. imposing liability for some- act. We need not address here the
question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient
for civil liability under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5.6 9
At the same time, the Court recognized that "[o]ther Courts of Appeals
have held that some type of scienter-.e., intent to defraud, reckless
disregard for the truth, or knowing use of some practice to defraudis necessary in . . . [a rule 10b-5] action."70 The question is whether
the Court will adopt the broader interpretation of "scienter" which has
been recognized with near unanimity among lower federal courts and,
if so, whether it will be limited in its application to certain circumstances. This adoption should be distinguished from approval of recklessness as evidence of intent to deceive which may be assumed to be
71
proper.
A review of the courts which, prior to Hochfelder, had rejected a
negligent standard indicates a refusal by the courts to engraft a strict
intent to deceive standard on the remedial securities regulations adopted
since 1933. In Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,72 the leading case on scienter
under section 10(b) prior to Hochfelder, the Second Circuit held that
rule 10b-5 requires "proof of a willful or reckless disregard for the
truth . . . -73 Explaining further, the court said:
In determining what constitutes "willful or reckless disregard for the
truth" the inquiry normally will be to determine whether the defendants
knew the material facts misstated or omitted, or failed or refused, after
being put on notice of a possible material failure of disclosure, to apprise themselves of the facts where they could have done so without any
extraordinary effort, . . . The answer to the inquiry will of course depend upon the circumstances of the particular case, including the nature
and duties of the corporate positions held by the defendants. 74
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
Id. (emphasis added).
See Trussel v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 772 (D. Colo. 1964).
479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
Id. at 1306.
Id. at 1306 n.98 (citation omitted).
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This standard of recklessness "tantamount to wilful, fraud" 75 was

applied by the Second Circuit in SEC v. Frank76 against an attorney
guilty of drafting a false and misleading disclosure document. In reversing the injunction on other grounds, the court indicated that an attorney

will be liable for assisting in circulating a statement "he knows to be
false," and that he cannot "escape liability for77 fraud by closing his eyes
to what he saw and could readily understand.1
Judge Adams' dissenting opinion in Kohn v. American Metal
Climax, Inc. 78 reviewed the principal pre-Lanza cases and concluded

that scienter has not been confined to strict notions of fraudulent intent;
rather, it has been applied flexibly according to such variables as the

nature of the plaintiff, 79 the relief requested," ° and the relationship between the parties."
75. This is the view of SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968), offered by
Judge Adams in his well-known dissent in Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458
F.2d 255, 281 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972). See notes 78-80 infra
and accompanying text. Compare the remarks of Judge Friendly concurring in SEC
v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 864 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc) (Friendly, J.
concurring), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See also Katz v. Realty Equities Corp.,
406 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
76. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
77. Id. at 489.
78. 458 F.2d at 281-88. Adams' opinion dissented in part and concurred in part.
79. Judge Adams stated:
One distinction the cases suggest depends on the nature of the plaintiff. . . . It
is fitting that in the face-to-face confrontations, courts should impose a higher
standard of disclosure by lessening the degree of culpability upon which liability
can be imposed. From a practical standpoint, in such situations, the amount of
damages is relatively finite, whereas in a suit on behalf of a class composed of
thousands of shareholders, damages might well extend into millions of dollars.
When faced with such huge potential payments, the brunt of which will be borne
by innocent shareholders of the defendant corporation, the courts seem to have proceeded more slowly, by requiring that the plaintiff class prove conduct closer to
the traditional concepts of actionable fraud.
Id. at 286.
80. As to the nature of the relief requested, Judge Adams wrote:
Where the Government or a private party is seeking prospective injunctive relief
only, it is appropriate that courts be able to protect the investors and shareholders
from future harm even though the conduct involved does not amount to common
law fraud. On the other hand, when the plaintiff class is seeking retrospective relief, such as substantial money damages or dissolution of a merger, more serious
problems arise and a different balance must be struck. . . . Where the relief discourages conduct through punishment, whether by damages or by divestiture, . . .
courts [should] cleave close to the Congressional purpose by construing the statute
strictly, and to affix liability only where culpable conduct is made out.
Id. at 286-87 (citation omitted).
81. The parties' relationship should be a factor because
[i]n the normal course of events, the ordinary shareholder has the right to rely on
the fiduciary relationship between himself and his company to the extent of justifiably believing that recommendations with regard to shareholder action are in the
best interest of the company. . . . Hence, in self-dealing transactions, it does not
seem unreasonable for courts, in an effort to achieve the required disclosure, to
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It appears that the weight of authority recognized the flexible nature
of the scienter concept.8 2 White v. Abrams,83 expressing the Ninth
Circuit's "flexible duty standard," should therefore retain considerable
authority subject to the exclusion of mere negligence as a potential basis
4

for liability.A

Certainly, the language of section 10(b), which, according to the
Court in Hochfelder, is determinative with respect to precluding liability based upon negligence, does not per se command adherence to a
strict intent to deceive standard. 5 Since all commentators concede the
paucity of legislative history, resort must be had to the underlying policy
react by apparently lowering the standard of actionable conduct.
Id. at 287.
82. Three recent, pre-Hochifelder district court decisions illustrate the principle in connection with actions against a bank, an accounting firm and a broker-dealer, respectively. See Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 56 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Oleck v. Fischer,
401 F. Supp. 651, 656 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 955 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
83. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
84. In evaluating the secondary liability of a corporate defendant with respect to a
misleading proxy statement of an issuer, the district court in H. L. Federman & Co.
v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) observed:
The Ninth Circuit has proposed a flexible duty standard to judge a defendant's
responsibilities under aiding and abetting standards. See White v. Abrams, 495
F.2d 724, 734 (9th Cir. 1974). While this approach may be inconsonant with the
Second Circuit's emphasis on scienter, this Court may properly assess the relationship of the defendant to the issuer in evaluating the knowledge element.
Id. at 1338 n.2 (citation omitted).
In a decision rendered shortly before Hochfielder, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
reaffirmed the role of the flexible duty formula in evaluating the accuracy and adequacy of a broker's representation to a client-investor. Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler &
Co., 534 F.2d 156, 176 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 896 (1976).
For other pre-Hochifelder cases apparently adopting flexible duty analysis, see, e.g.,
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-80 (3rd Cir. 1976) (aiding
and abetting liability under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act); Rochez Bros., Inc. v.
Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886-87 (3rd Cir. 1975) (aiding and abetting liability of corporate issuer for misconduct of insider); Fischer v. NYSE, 408 F. Supp. 745, 751-54 (S.D.
N.Y. 1976) (stock exchange duty to disclose under theory of secondary liability); Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 53-57 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (secondary liability of a bank);
SEC v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497, 503-04 (E.D. Ky. 1975), aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240
(6th Cir. 1976) (building contractor duty to disclose profits in project financed by sales
of bonds). See generally Ruder, Factors Determining the Degree of Culpability Neces.
sary for Violation of the Federal Securities Laws in Information Transmission Cases,
32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 571, 577 (1975).
As the courts have begun to evaluate the implications of the Supreme Court's decision,
the initial returns evidence the continued vitality of the flexible duty concept. See,
e.g., Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976); Carr
v. NYSE, 414 F. Supp. 1292, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United States Steel v. Orenstein,
[Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,680 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
85. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974).
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of the 1934 Act."6 The "broad remedial purposes" consistently emphasized by the Supreme Court

7

would be frustrated by imposition of

a standard of conduct otherwise subject to traditional state law liability.
In this connection, it should be noted that even common law fraud

actions under state law may rest on representations made in reckless
disregard of truth or falsity. 8 Also significant is the willingness of the
federal courts to move away from common law fraud with respect to

other section 10(b) elements, such as reliance.8 9

In SEC v. Capital

Gains Research Bureau, Inc., the Supreme Court observed:
There has ... been a growing recognition by common-law courts that
the doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions
involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the
sale of such intangibles as advice and securities, and that, accordingly,
the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue. 90

It therefore appears that the broader view of scienter in Lanza v. Drexel
92
& Co.,91 should ultimately prevail, subject to the defense of good faith.

86. By contrast, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder, refused to consider the issues of
public policy in the face of a conclusion that the statutory language was dispositive.
425 U.S. at 214-16 n.33.
87. See cases cited note 31 supra.
88. For an extensive discussion of common law fraud concepts in light of the rule
lob-5 scienter standard, see Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and 10b-5, 32 Bus.
LAw. 147 (1976). The author's thesis is that recklessness is a recognized basis for
fraud liability under the common law and that scienter under rule 10b-5 represents an
equivalent standard.
89. See Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
90. 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963) (citation omitted).
91. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc). See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
92. While the Supreme Court's ruling in Hochfelder leaves the scope of scienter in
doubt, much of the problem seems resolved by the Court's strong suggestion that good
faith is a defense under all circumstances. After reviewing the legislative history of
section 10(b), and focusing on the legislative reports, the Court concluded: "There
is no indication that Congress intended anyone to be made liable for such practices
unless he acted other than in good faith. The catch-all provision of § 10(b) should
be interpreted no more broadly." 425 U.S. at 206.
The defense of good faith has also been urged by the lower courts. In Kohn V.
American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874
(1972) (Adams, J., dissenting), based on the same legislative reports cited in Hoch-

felder, Judge Adams observed:
Essential to the elements intended by Congress are the requirements that the defendant has acted in other than "good faith" and that the plaintiff has "relied" on the
misleading statement.. . . There is no evidence that Congress intended that under
Section 10(b) anyone should be an insurer against false or misleading statements
made non-negligently or in good faith.
Id. at 280. The Second Circuit has concurred in this view. See Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1299 (2d Cir. 1973).
As a subjective measure of a person's conduct, good faith expands the buffer zone
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This has been the consistent position taken by the courts after
93

Hochfelder.

C.

Aiding and Abetting

It is generally acknowledged that liability under the securities laws
may be primary, as where one is a "participant" with others in an unlawful course of conduct or is otherwise individually guilty of a tortious
act (or omission), or liability may be secondary, as where one conspires
with or aids and abets the unlawful conduct of principals. 4 Expansion
of attorney liability has occurred under both of these theories. On the
one hand, there has been a steady erosion of the traditional view that
participant liability is necessarily limited to an attorney who has overstepped his professional roleY5 On the other hand, attorneys have increasingly come under the scrutiny of the securities laws as aiders and
abettors of their clients' misadventures. This latter approach is most
evident in recent SEC enforcement proceedings. 6
The Hochfelder case, involving accountants rather than attorneys,
had been considered a harbinger of anticipated expansion of secondary
liability in civil damage actions against attorneys. Unlike previous
cases where plaintiffs pleaded primary and secondary liability as alternative theories,0 7 Hochfelder involved a complaint which alleged that
created by the exclusion of negligence (an objective measure based on a "reasonable
person" standard) and provides greater certainty for attorneys who must make difficult
judgments regarding materiality of information undisclosed, the legitimacy of business
reasons for nondisclosure, and registration requirements under the 1933 Act.
93. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,804 (2d Cir. 1976); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., [1975-1976 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,543 (7th Cir. 1976); Bartels v. Algonquia Properties,
Ltd., [Current] Fan. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,865 (D. Vt. 1977); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman
Dillon & Co., [Current] FE . SEC. L. REP. (CCH) f 95,843 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); SEC v.
Trans Jersey Bancorp, [Current] FaD. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,818 (D.N.J. 1976);
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., [Current] FaD. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,722 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); McLean v. Alexander, [Current] Fan. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,725 (D. Del.
95,670
1976); Del Noce v. Delyar Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1245-46
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248, 251 (ED. Pa.
1976).
94. See A. BROMBERO, 2 SEcuarrEs LAw: FRAuD--SEC RULE 10b-5 § 8.5(515)
(1975) [hereinafter cited as BROMBERO]; Ruder, supra note 17, at 601, 620.
95. See, e.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). For discussion of participation and "seller" liability under section 12 of the 1933 Act, see notes 289-352 infra
and accompanying text.
96. See cases cited note 28 supra.
97. See, e.g., SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
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the accountants were liable only as aiders and abettors in that their im-

properly conducted audits failed to uncover the fraudulent scheme of
the brokerage firm president. 98 The Seventh Circuit's holding, as char-

acterized by Justice Powell, reflects the single issue of aiding and
abetting liability:
The Court of Appeals... [held] that one who breaches a duty of inquiry and disclosure owed another is liable in damages for aiding and
abetting a third party's violation of Rule 10b-5 if the fraud would have
99
been discovered or prevented but for the breach.
In view of the posture of the pleadings, one might reasonably have

supposed that any discussion of the degree of misconduct necessary to
hold the accounting firm liable in damages for aiding and abetting
would include reference to the elements of a claim for aiding and

abetting, at least with respect to state of mind. Yet, remarkably, the
Supreme Court dismissed the action without even reaching the question

of secondary liability.' 00 It seems that the Court was implying that, if
scienter is required for a primary violation of section 10(b) and rule

10b-5, then at least as much should be required to find a violation by
an aider and abettor. Since the Court insists on playing with cards
close to the chest, courts and commentators must continue to speculate

on the ultimate resolution of these issues.
The question of whether aiding and abetting is an appropriate basis

for liability under section 10(b) seems indisputably answered in the
affirmative. Having been sanctioned as early as 1939 in a 1933 Act
enforcement action, 10 even before an implied private right of action
908 (1975); Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971); Fischer v. Kletz, 266
F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
98. The Supreme Court declined to consider the issue of primary liability for violations of a "direct duty" owed by the accountants under section 17(a) and rule 17a-5.
425 U.S. at 194 n.13.

99. Id. at 191.
100. The Court evaded the issue by saying:
In view of our holding that an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud is required
for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, we need not consider whether
nor the elements necessary
civil liability for aiding and abetting is appropriate .
to establish such a cause of action.
Id. at 191-92 n.7.
It is this author's view that for the Supreme Court to persist in its sphinx-like silence
on an issue so critical to the effective operation of the federal securities laws and the
liability of professionals as aiding and abetting is to abdicate the Court's responsibility.
To have done so in this case would -not have required far-ranging dicta. If anything,
the ruling on the issue of scienter with respect to primary liability, not even presented
in Hoch elder, was itself inconsistent with the tenet that only issues requiring the high
court's resolution will be considered.
101. SEC v. Timetrust, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 34, 43 (N.D. Cal. 1939), remanded, 130
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under rule 1Ob-5 was first recognized, 102 and applied since that time
in an unbroken line of civil damage actions beginning with Brennan
v. Midwestern United Life Insurance Co., °3 the propriety of aiding and
abetting liability under section 10(b) has never been subject to serious
04
challenge.1
The focus of debate has been on the elements rather than the propriety, of an aiding and abetting claim. 05 One uncontroverted element
is the existence of an independent wrong by a principal. 00 The second
element is that the secondary defendant must give "substantial assistance" to the principal wrongdoer. This is not disputed in theory but
is disputed in its application, particularly in cases of inaction by one
owing a duty to perform acts which would prevent or disclose the fraud
of another.' 0 7 Lying at the center of controversy is the third element,
the requisite extent of the secondary defendant's knowledge of the nature

and illegality of the principal's conduct. 108 The knowledge requirement
F.2d 214 (9th Cir. 1942), rev'd, 142 F.2d 744, 746 (1944) (insufficient evidence of aiding and abetting).
102. The landmark case for implied civil liability was Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), ultimately approved by the Supreme Court in
Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971).
103. 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966), alf'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). For a listing of the significant secondary liability cases
prior to 1972, see Ruder, supra note 17, at 625-26 n.124. For recent cases, see note
84 supra.
104. The arguments against implied aiding and abetting liability are exhaustively considered and rejected by the Brennan court. 259 F. Supp. at 677-81.
105. The most influential statement of the elements of aiding and abetting liability
is found in RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 876(b) (1934), which imposes liability for harm
to a third party if the person "knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of
duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, . . ." Id. This formulation has been adopted in the Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth
and Seventh Circuits. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3rd Cir.
1975); Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94-97 (5th Cir, 1975); SEC
v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1315-18 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332,
1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
106. As Professor Ruder indicates:
Whether the liability of the secondary defendant is based upon conspiracy or aiding
and abetting, an independent illegal act or venture must exist to which he can attach
himself either by agreement or by action. If his own act is unlawful, he becomes
the primary violator of the securities law. Courts that have imposed liability, administrative sanctions, or criminal penalties upon secondary defendants in securities
law cases often do not emphasize the independent wrong requirement, because in
most such cases the wrong is easily established.
Ruder, supra note 17, at 628.
107. These cases will be considered in the discussion of duty. See notes 141-47 infra
and accompanying text.
108. See discussion in Ruder, supra note 17, at 630-38.
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/

in aiding and abetting cases has long been a sub-theme in the general
debate concerning scienter under section 10(b). The issue has been
whether the state of mind requirement ultimately adopted for purposes
of primary liability should apply equally to secondary liability. It has
been argued that the knowledge requirement should be more rigidly
applied as the defendant's position becomes further removed from the
primary wrong. Much of the debate came in response to the incipient
trend, prior to Hochfelder, of approving negligence as a standard of
fraud under some circumstances: 10 9 As Professor Ruder argued:
Although elimination of a scienter requirement in order to establish violation by the primary participant may be urged upon the grounds that
maximum protection of investors will be provided by requiring exercise
of care when engaging in activities that might injure others, different
considerations enter into eliminating scienter as an element of aiding and
abetting or conspiracy and substituting a duty of inquiry or a "should
have known" standard. In most cases, the alleged aider and abettor (or
conspirator) will merely be engaging in customary business activities.
. . . If each of these parties will be required to investigate the ultimate

activities of the party whom he is assisting, a burden may be imposed
upon business activities that is too great. 10
Given the Supreme Court's resolution of the scienter debate in favor
of a standard of culpability greater than simple negligence, it is clear
that secondary liability can require no less in an action for damages
against those whose conduct, taken alone, is neither tortious nor unlawful." ' This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that Hochfelder involved solely aiding and abetting liability. One may also resort to proxy
solicitation liability cases decided under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act
for which a negligence standard, has been applied for primary liability
with a more rigorous scienter standard invoked as to secondary defendants.
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109. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974); Myzel v. Fields, 386
F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
110. Ruder, supra note 17, at 632-33.
111. The court in Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1976),
a case involving accountants, observed:
Actual knowledge, or a reckless disregard for the truth which is equivalent to actual
knowledge, is a prerequisite to . . . civil liability . . . [under] Rule lOb-5 in this
Circuit. Actual knowledge is also a prerequisite to liability for damages for aiding
and abetting a violation of the securities laws; a negligent failure to inquire and
disclose is an insufficient basis on which to impose liability of aiding and abetting
the alleged misconduct. Any other rule would give rise to the anomaly of assessing
liability on peripheral defendants on a lesser standard of culpability than that required for the direct liability of a principal.
Id. at 805 (citations omitted).
112. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 779-80 (3d Cir. 1976).
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The remaining question is whether, and under what circumstances,
aiding and abetting will require a more demanding degree of culpability, such as knowledge that a third person's conduct is in fact illegal.
The "flexible duty" analysis urged by the Seventh Circuit in Hochfelder
v. Ernst & Ernst,'" the Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams"14 and,
arguably, the Second Circuit in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,"" may as yet
have a role to play in the resolution of the issue."" As in the case
of scienter generally, there may also be room for a differential standard
for aiding and abetting liability in enforcement actions brought by the
Commission." 7 Finally, courts will increasingly be called upon to
formulate standards of culpability for purposes of aiding and abetting
liability under other sections of the securities laws such as section 12
18
of the 1933 Act.
D.
1.

Concept of Duty

Advent of Duty Analysis

The modern trend toward liability of attorneys under the securities
laws has called into question the traditional view of the dual responsibility of attorneys: the duties of competence and fidelity to the client
and the duty to refrain from violations of law. Aiding and abetting liability has had the single greatest influence on the current debate because, as is the nature of secondary liability, the attorney's liability is
assertedly derived from the conduct of others, usually the corporate
client, its officers and directors, and does not, taken alone, violate the
obligation to act within the bounds of the law. Where aiding and abetting liability is based on the failure to investigate and/or disclose the
wrongful acts of the client, as was true in Hochfelder, it inevitably poses
the most difficult of dilemmas: the duty to zealously protect the client's
interests, as reinforced by the attorney-client privilege, versus the
potential for personal liability to the investing public for guarding the
client's secrets. Where aiding and abetting liability is imposed on an
attorney for negligence, it poses a poorly disguised challenge to the traditional tenet of foreseeability: an attorney is liable for malpractice only
to the client or to those third persons expressly intended to benefit from
113. 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
114. 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
115. 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d
724, 732-33 (9th Cir. 1974).
116. See note 84 supra and accompanying text.
117. See notes 188-257 infra and accompanying text.
118. See notes 353-64 infra and accompanying text.
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the attorney's services."

9

The resolution of competing duties to the

client and to the public underlies the entire body of securities laws with
respect to attorney liability, whether the attorney's role is one of drafter
12
opinion letters, :12112or is one of adviser. 2- of disclosure documents 2 0 and
In departing from traditional views of liability of attorneys in the

special field of securities laws, courts have found little guidance from
the securities regulations which deal with the responsibilities of every
profession involved in the registration and sale of securities 2 3 except

attorneys. 24 Once again, Hochfelder is illustrative. The question before the court of appeals was whether the scope of the independent

accountant's duty of care in conducting a certified audit included the
defrauded clients of First Securities as beneficiaries. The common law
duty of care, most clearly analogous to the duty of care of an attorney,

was held not to extend to the plaintiffs. 25 In the view of the court
of appeals, however, a statutory duty to plaintiffs did arise from section
17(a) of the 1934 Act and Commission rule 17a-5.' 26 No such expressed statutory basis of duty exists for attorneys.
2.

Distinguishing Duty, Scope of Duty and
Standard of Conduct

It is becoming increasingly evident that the trend toward individual

liability of professionals as aiders and abettors is a judicial device for
raising the level of accountability of such professionals to the investing

public where their conduct facilitates the wrongful acts of others but
119. Compare Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr.
375 (1976), with Roberts v. Ball, Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104,
128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976). See generally Doty, Application of the Antifraud Provisions
of the Federal Securities Laws to Exempt Offerings: Duties of Underwriters and Counsel, 16 B.C. IND. & COM. L. R.v. 393, 443-45 (1975); Lathrop & Rinehart, Legal Malpractice and Rule 10b-5 Liability: Pitfalls For The Occasional Securities Practitioner,
5 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 449, 462-70 (1972).
120. See, e.g., SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968). See text accompanying
notes 150-51 infra.
121. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed in text
at note 209 infra; SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C.
1975), discussed in text at note 154 infra.
122. Cf. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1974) (in a shareholder derivative suit, attorney-client privilege subject to
competing interests of corporation and shareholders). See notes 173-74 infra and
accompanying text.
123. See notes 11-17 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
125. See notes 50-52 supra and accompanying text.
126. 503 F.2d at 1105.
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is not otherwise proscribed by statute or common law. It appears,
moreover, that duty analysis will become the primary vehicle for the
development of secondary liability. If this is true, it will first be necessary for greater consideration to be given to the distinction and interrelationship of three aspects: duty, scope of duty and standard of
conduct. Greater consideration must also be given to the application
127
of these areas in the context of affirmative and passive conduct.
In the broadest sense of the term, duty involves a relationship
between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the
benefit of the other. 12 When duty is applied to affirmative conduct,
it arises from the creation of risk of injury or harm to others. It is the
essence of the law of torts that one is bound to refrain from conduct
which by its nature or the manner of its performance creates an unreasonable risk of harm to another person. In the famous words of
Cardozo: "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be
obeyed, . . .129
Inseparable from the consideration of liability for tortious breach of
this duty is the scope of that liability. For negligent torts, scope of liability is usually evaluated as a question of proximate cause.' 80 Continuing the Cardozo analysis: "[R]isk imports relation; it is risk to
another or to others within the range of apprehension."'
When negligence is alleged, the foreseeability of injury to the plaintiff defines the
perimeters of liability for the defendant. When the alleged tort goes beyond negligence and involves the state of mind of the defendant, foreseeability is no longer a factor and the scope of liability increases. 13 2 The
state of mind of the defendant also relates to the third aspect of a duty
analysis, namely, standard of conduct.
With this prelude, we may now consider attorney liability for negligence in the performance of professional duties. The traditional
approach has been that the scope of liability for professional malpractice negligence is confined to the client and intended third party
beneficiaries. 3 In California, however, there has been some support
127. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF LAW OF TORTS 324-37 (4th ed. 1971)

[hereinafter cited as PRossER].
128. Id. at 324.
129. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 100 (N.Y. 1928).
130. See generally PROSSER, supra note 127, at 244-45.
131. 162 N.E. at 100.

132. See Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441 (N.Y. 1931).
133. See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961).
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for expanded attorney liability to third persons. 134

Developments

under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws prior to
Hochfelder suggested an imminent break in that foreseeability barrier.

As always, attorneys were watchful of the fate of accountants as
prophetic of their own liability. The Cardozo dictum in Ultramares
Corp. v. Touche,185 limiting an accountant's liability for negligence to
intended third party beneficiaries, had come under growing criticism.136
Then, the Seventh Circuit's decision in Hochfelderl 37 recognizing a

statutory duty of care unencumbered by foreseeability limitations,
presented a significant development in professional liability to the investing public as third party beneficiaries.'
134. In Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal. 2d 647, 320 P.2d 16 (1958), the California Supreme Court delineated the policy considerations relevant to determining the existence
of an attorney's duty to third persons: (1) the extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff; (2) the foreseeability of harm to him; (3) the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; (4) the closeness of the connection between
the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered; (5) the moral blame attached to the
defendant's conduct; and (6) the policy of preventing future harm. Id. at 650, 320 P.2d
at 19.
Developments since Biakania, however, have not conformed to the expectations of
some observers that the case would open the way for greatly expanded negligence liability. Subsequent cases seem to hold that, in the absence of culpability greater than negligence, third party liability has been confined to a narrow class of clearly foreseeable
and intended beneficiaries. Compare Heyer v. Flaig, 70 Cal. 2d 223, 449 P.2d 161, 74
Cal. Rptr. 225 (1969) (beneficiary of a will); Bucquet v. Livingston, 57 Cal. App. 3d
914, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514 (1976) (beneficiary of testamentary trust); Roberts v. Ball,
Hunt, Hart, Brown & Baerwitz, 57 Cal. App. 3d 104, 128 Cal. Rptr. 901 (1976) (issuance of opinion letter to induce investment by third parties to invest in clients' enterprise); and Donald v. Garry, 19 Cal. App. 3d 769, 97 Cal. Rptr. 191 (1971) (attorney
for collections agency owes duty to creditor), with Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d
335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375 (1976) (no duty of care to third party investor
when advising client on consequences of proposed securities transaction); National Auto
& Cas. Ins. Co. v. Atkins, 45 Cal. App. 3d 562, 119 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1975) (no duty
to inform creditors of pending probate proceedings in deceased client's estate); Ventura
Cty. Humane Sot'y, Inc. v. Holloway, 40 Cal. App. 3d 897, 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974)
(no duty to potential beneficiaries under ambiguous will when testator suggests ambiguity); Brian v. Christensen, 35 Cal. App. 3d 377, 110 Cal. Rptr. 688 (1973) (no duty
to inform state agency of client's successful lawsuit where client fails to reimburse
agency for Medi-Cal benefits).
Outside the field of securities laws, no case of reckless or wilful misconduct by attorneys, comparable to that suggested in Ultramares, has yet arisen. See note 132 supra
and accompanying text.
135. 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931).
136. See, e.g., Rusch Factors, Inc. v. Levin, 284 F. Supp. 85, 90-91 (D.R.I. 1968).
137. 503 F.2d at 1105.
138. The SEC's position in the amicus curiae brief filed in the Hochfelder case was
that liability for negligence could be predicated upon detrimental reliance of investors
where such reliance was contemplated or reasonably foreseeable. 425 U.S. 185, 198
n.18.
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The Supreme Court's decision to circumscribe the availability of
rule 10b-5 in third party actions against professionals for negligence
could have rested on either of two grounds. Without addressing the
scienter debate, the Court could have focused on the scope of liability
of accountants, or professionals generally.'"" It could have settled the
question of whether the securities laws extended a duty of care in favor
of relying investors. Or the Court's ruling could have been confined
solely to the scope of secondary liability of the professional. Instead,
the Court chose to resolve the question of liability to third parties by
requiring some sort of scienter, thereby excluding negligence as a basis
for liability under rule 10b-5. In effect, this mooted the Ultramares
debate for purposes of rule 10b-5 because all courts agree that affirmative tortious conduct actuated by recklessness or deceitful intent would
be a basis for expanded professional liability.14 In sum, the decision
in Hochfelder precludes the development of the nascent flexible duty
standard under rule 10b-5 by which the foreseeability barrier in negligence actions might have given way to a broadened duty of accountants
and attorneys to the investing public.
Thus far we have spoken only of "duty" in the context of positive,
tortious conduct and considered the impact of the Hoch/felder requirement of conduct actuated by scienter in relation to the liability of attorneys and other professionals in the securities field to third party investors. It is this author's view that the application of the duty concept
to liability for failure to act requires a wholly discrete analysis in which
Hochfelder will have only marginal importance.
Risk creation, the primary basis for duty with respect to affirmative
misconduct, is seldom, if ever, regarded as a direct consequence of inaction.1 41 This is, in part, an explanation of the traditional view of the
common law that one is not liable for failure to act, i.e., prevent harm
to another, in the absence of a duty to act. 142 Rights, not risks, are
the primary basis for the duty to act for the benefit of others.' 4" It
139. The Court's concern over the potential scope of professional liability to thousands
of public investors is clearly expressed in the Court's opinion. Id. at 214 n.33.
140. See note 132 supra and accompanying text.
141. This distinction between misfeasance and nonfeasance has been explained:
The reason for the distinction may be said to lie in the fact that by "misfeasance"
the defendant has created a new risk of harm to the plaintiff, while by "nonfeasance"
he has at least made his situation no worse, and has merely failed to benefit him
by interfering in his affairs.
PROSSER, supra note 127, at 339.
142. Id. at 338-39.
143. Dean Prosser observed:
Liability for "misfeasance," then, may extend to any person to whom harm may
reasonably be anticipated as a result of the defendant's conduct, or perhaps even
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is not enough, for instance, that an attorney has learned of past fraudulent conduct. Liability for aiding and abetting will follow only where
a duty to disclose exists. It may only be asserted by those to whom
the duty is owed. Unlike the duty analysis in the context of positive,
tortious conduct, the scope of a duty to act for the benefit of another
is defined solely by the nature of the duty itself. Neither objective
foreseeability of harm nor state of mind will expand or restrict the perimeters of the duty to act. Instead, the existence of a duty and the class
of beneficiaries will be determined by the status of the parties, the relationship between them and attendant circumstances.
That Hochfelder contributes little to the analysis of liability for omissions becomes clear if the factual circumstances of that case are
changed by hypothesis. Suppose that the accountants had challenged
Nay's mail rule, discovered the fraud, but failed to come forward publicly? Two inquiries would first have to be made: (1) Was the
accounting firm bound to reveal fraud? (2) Were the defrauded investors beneficiaries of that obligation? Certainly, the answer is yes
to both questions.144 Have the plaintiffs established a prima facie violation of rule 10b-5 merely by the failure to disclose or does the HochJelder requirement of scienter, clearly applicable to affirmative misconduct, impose some further requirement of proof regarding the accountants' motive for silence? Stated otherwise, would there be any excuse
whatsoever for the failure to disclose Nay's fraudulent scheme? Any
defense would seem inappropriate. This was the view adopted on
45
similar facts in Fischerv. Kletz:'
The imposition of the duty [of disclosure] creates an objective standard against which to measure a defendant's actions and leaves no room
for an analysis of the subjective considerations inherent in the area of
intent. Thus, to base liability in part upon subjective standards of intent
of the nondisclosing defendant would blur and weaken the objective
basis of impact of nondisclosure upon the plaintiff. In the alternative,
if this rationale be deemed unacceptable, it can be persuasively urged
that in a nondisclosure case, intent can be sensibly imputed to a defendant who, knowing that plaintiff will rely upon his original representa46
tions, sits by silently when they turn out to be false.1
beyond; while for "nonfeasance" it is necessary to find some
tween the parties, of such a character that social policy justifies
to act.
Id. at 339.
144. See, e.g., Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100,
rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
145. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). For a discussion of
Fischer, see notes 163-69 infra and accompanying text.
146. 266 F. Supp. at 188.

definite relation beimposition of a duty
1114 (7th Cir. 1974),
the duty to disclose in
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Similarly, it is difficult to conceive of any justification for an attorney's
failure to disclose a client's intent to perpetrate a future fraud against
another person when the attorney could not dissuade the client. Scienter simply plays no meaningful role in limiting liability for breach of
a duty to act. 14 And, since the Supreme Court has not spoken directly
on the issue of when attorneys or other professionals are subject to a
legal duty to act, the question of liability for inaction under section
10(b) remains open.
3. Duties of Attorneys
It appears that affirmative conduct by an attorney, which is either
deceptive or manipulative or which facilitates such conduct by others
and which injures persons relying thereon, when actuated by intent or
reckless disregard, will be actionable under rule 10b-5. The traditional
view of attorney qua attorney immunity is no longer a viable defense.
The two most significant functions of an attorney in the securities field,
which come under the rule in Hochfelder, are to issue opinion letters
and to draft disclosure documents. The standard of liability under
rule 10b-5 is illustrated in two cases:
SEC v. Frank148 and SEC v.
49
National Student Marketing Corp.'

Frank involved a Commission enforcement action against an attorney
responsible for drafting an offering circular in connection with an intrastate offering which contained serious misrepresentations. The Second
Circuit rejected as "unimpressive" the defense that the defendant attorney had acted purely in a ministerial capacity, and in no event exceeded
his professional role:
A lawyer has no privilege to assist in circulating a statement with regard
to securities which he knows to be false simply because his client has
furnished it to him. . .

The SEC's position is that Frank had been

furnished with information which even a non-expert would recognize as
showing the falsity of many of the representations. .

.

. If this is so,

the Commission would be entitled to prevail; a lawyer, no more than
147. See McLean v. Alexander, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,725 (D.
Del. 1976); Goodman v. Kennedy, 18 Cal. 3d 335, 556 P.2d 737, 134 Cal. Rptr. 375
(1976); Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder in 10b-5, 32 Bus. LAw. 147, 162, 164-66
(1976).
It is acknowledged however that contrary authority exists. See, e.g., Rochez Bros.,
Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 889 (3rd Cir. 1975); H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332, 1337 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
148. 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968).
149. 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
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others, can escape liability for fraud by closing his eyes to what he saw
and could readily understand.' 50
Left open was the question of
[w]hether the fraud sections of the securities laws go beyond this and
require a lawyer passing on an offering circular to run down possible
infirmities in his client's story of which he has been put on notice, and
if so what efforts are required of him, [which] is a closer question on
which it is important that the court be seized of the precise facts, including the extent . . . to which [the attorney's] role went beyond a
lawyer's normal one . ...

151

This latter question, considered below in the context of passive conduct, 1 is partially answered by Hochfelder for, even assuming the attorney's duty to investigate the accuracy of information to be incorporated in a disclosure document, the breach of that duty must at least
involve recklessness in order to constitute a violation of section 10(b).
What is clear is that an attorney will be liable for knowingly making false
representations in a disclosure document drafted by him as corporate
counsel based on information acquired through the client.
The recent decision by Judge Parker in the National Student Marketing case considers the liability of counsel who knowingly issues a misleading opinion letter. Attorney Katz was found to have issued an
opinion letter regarding the propriety of backdating a transaction in
order to remove certain losses from the finn's annual statement and
present a brighter financial picture. 153 The court rejected the defense
that the opinion was technically correct as a matter of law because this
ignored the plain "commercial substance" of the transaction as a sham
bound to mislead investors and shareholders:
[T]his Court rejects the proposition that a member of the bar can seek
refuge behind a legal technicality, elevating form over substance, when
he is a party to and fully familiar with the circumstances which indicate
that an illusory transaction is being undertaken which could be utilized
to mislead third parties.
[I]t can be inferred from the factual circumstances of this case that
Katz either knew that NSMC planned to issue a false financial statement, or he ignored what should have been evident to him
as a lawyer
154
with some expertise in corporate mergers and acquisitions.
150. 388 F.2d at 489.

151. Id.
152. See notes 177-85 infra and accompanying text.
153. 402 F. Supp. 641 (D.D.C. 1975).
154. Id. at 648-49.
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Thus, it is evident that traditional functions of legal counsel may be
well within the scope of either primary or aiding and abetting liability.

The scope of liability is no longer limited by the traditional foreseeability
defense in a common law malpractice negligence action. On the other
hand, use of section 10(b) as a basis for an action by these third parties
necessitates proof of scienter and may well limit recovery on that basis.
As suggested above, in evaluating potential attorney liability for
passive conduct, the Hochfelder requirement regarding the requisite
standard of conduct is of questionable applicability. In that regard, an alternative duty analysis is essential and it is that aspect about which the
most significant struggles will take place in the development of the responsibilities and liabilities of attorneys under the securities laws.
Possession of material information or knowledge of the existence of a
fraudulent scheme by others will not alone create liability for an attorney who fails to disclose the information to the persons affected, regardless of the motive for silence. 155 There must first be a duty of disclosure created by a relationship between the attorney and the person or
class of persons adversely affected.156 And, similarly, where nondisclosure is linked to an attorney's failure to discover the material information, there must be established a duty toinvestigate and disclose.
a.

Duty of Disclosure

Under what circumstances will an attorney be liable for fraud under
section 10(b) for failure to disclose material information known to him?
In order to state such a claim, there must be a duty of disclosure owed
to the injured party. What, then, of the duty element? While many
of the questions remain imponderable, it is suggested that a useful
point of departure is to focus on the nature of the information, distinguishing between after-acquired information, which renders prior statements for which the attorney is responsible false or misleading, and information concerning
the misconduct of the corporate client, its officers
157
and directors.
155. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 96-97 (5th Cir.
1975); Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 161-62 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
960 (1974); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 417 F.2d 147, 154-55 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970); Gold v. DCL, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1123,
1127 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
156. Cf. Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971) (accountant's duty of disclosure).
157. The scope of the duty of disclosure, assuming one is found to exist, seems clear.
In the case of after-acquired information, the duty is owed to all persons to whom the
attorney would have been liable had the original representation been known to be false
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Less subject to challenge would be the duty to disclose information
which renders earlier statements of the attorney, whether in disclosure

documents or an opinion letter, false or misleading. To postulate such
a duty is merely to logically extend the rule in Frank and National
Student Marketing.18 This view is suggested by two cases.
SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc.'5 9 involved a failure to disclose
events transpiring subsequent to the effective date of a registration

statement which "materially alter[ed] the picture presented in the
registration statement."1 60 One of the principal defendants was Erzine,
an attorney.

While his role exceeded the traditional functions of an

attorney in several respects, 16' his responsibility as drafter of the registration statement appears to have sufficed to hold him liable for wilful
62

nondisclosure.
Fischer v. Kletz 6 3 is a leading case on the liability of accountants for
nondisclosure of subsequently discovered information which materially
affects certified financial statements for which they were responsible.
Plaintiffs alleged that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company had audited
and certified the financial statements for the 1963 annual report of Yale
Express System, Inc.' 64 Later, in 1964, in the course of "special
studies" being produced at the request of Yale for the benefit of internal
accounting controls, Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company allegedly discovered important misstatements in the 1963 financials but failed to disat the time made, i.e., those persons relying on the statement. With respect to the duty
to disclose the misconduct of others, this duty would presumably run to the class of
plaintiffs to whom the primary offender would himself be liable, a question of reliance
and proximate cause.
158. This is precisely the theory adopted by the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 551(b)
(1938), discussed in text at note 166 infra. See Small, supra note 10, at 1228.
159. 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972).
160. Id. at 1095.
161. Clearly a participant even under the traditional view, Erzine exercised blanket
authority in the matter of securities transactions in connection with the Manor offering,
id. at 1089 n.3, personally solicited offers to buy, id. at 1090, and effected the actual
transactions, id. at 1091.
162. The court stated:
Erzine's claim that he acted in good faith likewise is belied by the evidence adduced at trial. As an experienced securities lawyer, he was well aware that failure
to correct a misleading prospectus and retention of the proceeds even though the
issue had not been fully subscribed constituted violations of the antifraud provisions
of the securities laws. Indeed, Erzine's knowledge that the federal securities laws
required public disclosure of developments . . . subsequent to the effective date...
is indicated by his supplementing the Manor prospectus (with regard to the participation of an underwriter in the offering).
Id. at 1096-97 (footnotes omitted).
163. 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
164. Id. at 182.
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close these until 1965 when the special studies were released. 10 The
duty to disclose after-acquired information was defended on the basis of
both the common law and the requirements of section 10 (b). Relying on
section 551 of the first Restatement of Torts, 66 the district court held
17
that a duty of disclosure exists under the common law tort of deceit.
Commenting on the argument that deceitful intent is a requisite to
liability for such nondisclosure, the district court found that "intent can
be sensibly imputed to a defendant who, knowing that plaintiff will rely
upon his original representations, sits by silently when they turn out to
be false."' 1 8 Thus, in effect, knowledge that the prior statements were
false both creates the duty and, coupled with inaction, defines the
necessary culpability. As to liability under section 10(b), while the
court professed some doubt on the viability of a claim of primary
liability, it felt that a claim for aiding and abetting was stated. 10
While the attorney's duty to correct past misstatements later discovered to be false seems well founded, the issue of compelled disclosure
of the misdeeds of other persons, usually the client, raises vastly more
difficult questions which can only be resolved on a case-by-case
basis. 170 The traditional view, as expressed in the American Bar
Association (ABA) Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) is that
an attorney's general ethical obligation is to preserve the confidences
and secrets of his client and specifically to refrain from disclosing adverse information acquired through confidential communications protected by the attorney-client privilege.' 7 ' The ABA has urged that
attorneys not be subject to civil liability for conduct consistent with the
commands of the CPR.1 7 2 While the attorney-client privilege may no
longer be an absolute guarantee of confidentiality, at least in corporate
affairs where information is sought by the shareholders, 73 it is quite
165. Id. at 183.
166. Id. at 185.
167. Id. at 188. The fact that Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company's nondisclosure
was not motivated by personal gain was held immaterial. Id. at 187-88.
168. Id. at 188.
169. Id. at 189-94.
170. Excluded from discussion is the liability for nondisclosure of the attorneydirector. See, e.g., Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
171. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL EmIcs No. 4.
172. See ABA, Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, Corporation,
Banking and Business Law Section, The Code of ProfessionalResponsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice-A Report of the Committee
on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 Bus. LAw. 1289 (1975).
173. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1100-04 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971) (attorney-client privilege between corporate counsel and offi-
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another matter to hold attorneys liable for failing to volunteer such information where the client refuses to do so."' The SEC's position in
recent years has been that the unique role of attorneys in the field of
securities law renders them accountable to the investing public, in the

manner of independent accountants, and demands that counsel come
forward with information of fraud.' 75 While the Court has yet to confront the issue, the National Student Marketing litigation may offer the

first opportunity.1 70
b.

Duty to Investigate

Separate from the question of when knowledge compels disclosure
is the issue of when an attorney is obligated to seek information by inquiry. Here it is necessary to distinguish first between the duty not
to ignore obvious indications that a statement is false or that others associated with the attorney are engaged in or have committed unlawful
acts and the independent duty to investigate. Second, with respect to
the duty to investigate, there is a distinction to be drawn between the
attorney's voluntary assumption of the duty and the imposition of the
duty by law.
To the extent that disclosure is mandated by the possession of
material information, the duty to investigate upon the notice of the
cers not absolute in derivative action by shareholders where good cause is shown to compel disclosure of confidential communications).
174. It is Professor Shipman's view that Garner will ultimately be extended to the
duty of disclosure and other professional duties. See Shipman, supra note 10, at 257.
175. See Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 427.
176. The National Student Marketing litigation as it affects the firm of White and
Case has recently been settled by consent decree. Without admitting or denying the
Commission's allegations, the law firm will remain under a court order to enforce certain
control procedures for securities transactions. Attorney Epley consented to a six month
suspension from practice before the SEC. FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) No. 692, at 2 (May
5, 1977).
Academic and professional commentary on the implications of the National Student Marketing case is voluminous. See, e.g., Freeman, Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DugE L.J. 371; Koch, Attorney's Liability: The Securities Bar and the Impact of National Student Marketing, 14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 883 (1973); Lowenfels,
supra note 18, at 420-22; Shipman, supra note 10, at 232-35; Note, Duties and Obligations of the Securities Lawyer: The Beginning of a New Standard for the Legal Profession?, 1975 Duic L.J. 121; Note, Civil Procedure-Discovery--SECv. National Student
Marketing Corp., 6 Loy. CHi. L.J. 447 (1975); Note, A New Ethic of Disclosure-National Student Marketing and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 48 NOTRE DAME LAw. 661
(1973); Note, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corporation: The Extent of Attorney Liability, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 571 (1973); Note, SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corporation: The Attorney's Duty, 46 TEMP. L.Q. 153 (1973); Note, Securities Regulation-Attorney's Liability-Advising, Abetting and the SEC's National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 TEx. L. Ray. 1265 (1972).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

existence of such information is simply a corollary responsibility 177
to the
duty to disclose. An attorney cannot close his eyes to the obvious.
A more difficult task is to determine when an attorney must evaluate
the accuracy and completeness of information provided by the client
where there are no discrepancies or other suspicious indicators or when
an attorney must oversee the activities of the corporate client and its
agents with respect to matters within his responsibility. Once again,
the absence of case law requires an appreciable measure of speculation.
Certainly, under the circumstances of a particular case, an attorney's
opinion letter or a disclosure document drafted by him will reasonably
suggest that the attorney has conducted an investigation or that his
representations are otherwise based on personal knowledge. Members
of the investing public should be permitted to rely on the attorney's
professional judgment or representations. The failure to investigate
would, under these circumstances, render false what would be tantamount to a representation of fact. At the same time, of course, a
cautious attorney can clearly limit the extent of his undertaking to inquire into factual circumstances. 78 Such is not the case should the
duty to investigate be legally imposed upon the attorney by virtue of
his professional role in a particular event." 79
The imposition of a duty to investigate in favor of the investing
public could be imposed directly by express statutory authority or as
a matter of public policy. The Seventh Circuit's opinion in Hochfelder
illustrates the imposition of an express statutory duty of inquiry upon
the independent public accountant.' s0 No such comparable provision
exists for attorneys. 181 A duty to investigate might be implied under
section 10(b) by virtue of the critical role of securities lawyers. Yet,
a comparison of the Second Circuit's rulings regarding the "duty to convey" of an outside director in Lanza v. Drexel & Co. 82 and the responsibilities of an underwriter during the distribution of securities in ChrisCraft Industries, Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp. 8 3 suggests great difficulty
177. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968), discussed in text accompany-

ing notes 150-52 supra; SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 648
(D.D.C. 1975), discussed in text accompanying notes 153-54 supra.
178. See Small, supra note 10, at 1209-13.
179. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSiONAL ETics, OPwNONS, No. 335 (1973).
180. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
181. See discussion of attorney liability as an "expert" under section 11 at notes 36583 infra and accompanying text.
182. 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc).
183. 480 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).

1977]

SECURITIES MALPRACTICE

in finding an implied representation of verification by securities
counsel.'8 4
An alternative means of imposing a duty to investigate indirectly
would be to abandon scienter in favor of negligence as the measure
of liability to third persons, at least under some circumstances. 8 5 This
avenue is foreclosed in private damage actions under Hochfelder.Y86
Whether such an avenue is available in SEC enforcement actions and
private damage actions under the 1933 Act, however, remains an open
question.

IV. SEC

ENFORCEMENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION

10(b)

While the future impact of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 on attorney
liability for damages to purchasers or sellers of securities has measurably diminished with the decision in Hochfelder, the Supreme Court
carefully declined to rule on the state of mind element in actions for
equitable relief' 8 7 and, more specifically, SEC injunctive actions.' 88 In

view of the rulings in several courts, most notably the Second Circuit,
that negligence is a viable basis for granting injunctive relief under section 10(b), 1 9 it is important to consider the implications of a lesser
standard in actions for injunctive relief.

The potential for attorney

liability is enormous. While the pre-Hochfelder spectre of liability in
damages to third persons for mere negligence was unnerving, it should
be recalled that there has never been a reported instance of attorney

liability in damages to an investor for negligent conduct in an attorney's
purely professional role. 9 ° Those cases giving rise to the greatest con184. See, e.g., Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., [Current] FED.SEC. L. REP.
(CCH)
95,786 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
See Small, supra note 10, at 1217-20.
185. See Messer, Roles and Reasonable Expectations of the Underwriter,Lawyer and
Independent Securities Auditor in the Efficient Provision of Verified Information:
'Truth in Securities' Reinforced, 52 NEB. L. Rev. 429, 451 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Messer].
186. See, e.g., Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,786 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
187. In Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415 F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1976) it was
held that scienter is a necessary requirement in an equitable action for rescission under
rule lOb-5. Id. at 250.
188. The Court stated: "Since this case concerns an action for damages we also need
not consider the question whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Cf. SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180

. .

.(1963)."

425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.

189. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Dolnick,
501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974).
190. Attorneys have been held liable to investors or shareholders in damages for actual fraud as principals in fraudulent schemes. See cases cited note 18 supra. Liability
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troversy were brought by the Commission, not by private investors."'
Potential liabilities arising from an SEC enforcement action include
irreparable damage to an attorney's professional reputation, absence of
liability insurance coverage, 1 2 and consequent financial exposure from
the burden of a legal defense and a customary coattail of civil actions. 19a
But most devastating is the power of the Commission to automatically
suspend an attorney and his firm from practicing before it."0 4
A.

SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.: The View
of the Second Circuit

In the leading case on attorney liability for negligence under
section 10(b) in SEC enforcement actions, SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,'0 6
the Second Circuit held that an attorney who negligently prepares an
erroneous opinion letter asserting the exempt status of a proposed issuance of securities, which letter is used in the effort to effect the transaction, could be held liable in an action for injunctive relief by the SEC
where the transaction is ultimately shown to violate the registration requirements of the 1933 Act.' 96
Analysis of attorney Schiffman's peripheral role in the illegal distribution of securities in Spectrum is important to an assessment of the
potential exposure of attorneys acting in good faith, strictly in their
capacity as counsel. Schiffman was neither a participant in the scheme
in the traditional sense nor an officer, director, stockholder or control
in negligence in civil damage actions has been incurred by attorneys occupying a dual
role as attorney-director. See cases cited iote 19 supra. However, liability for negligent
conduct in a purely professional role has been confined to SEC enforcement actions. See,
e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
191. See cases cited note 28 supra.
192. It is a universal aspect of lawyer professional liability insurance that indemnity
coverage and the insurer's duty to defend are limited to claims for damages. See
KNEPP-R, supra note 11, at 310-13. This would seem to clearly preclude coverage in
Commission enforcement actions seeking injunctive relief. While the question has apparently not arisen in this specific context, cases involving other liability insurance policies suggest this conclusion. See Annot., 88 A.L.1L2d 1122 (1963).
193. The numerous civil actions which followed in the wake of the SEC's offensive
are detailed in KNEPPER, supra note 11, § 11.05, at 66 nn.7-11 (Supp. 1976).
194. See discussion in notes 250-57 infra and accompanying text.
195. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973).
196. Spectrum has sparked considerable comment among scholars. See, e.g., Lipman,
supra note 10, at 443-47; Lowenfels, supra note 18, at 431-33; Slain, Spectrum: An Attorney's Negligence May Make Him Liable as an Aider and Abettor of His Client's Securities Law Violations, 7 REv. oF SFC. REG. 927 (1974); Note, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1860
(1974); Note, 34 MD. L. REv. 327 (1974); Note, 19 VILL. L. REV. 932 (1974).
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person with respect to the issuer. As outside counsel,' 9 7Schiffman was

requested to author an opinion letter stating that the securities were
exempt from registration for two reasons: (1) pursuant to former rule
133, the exchange of shares between a surviving corporation to a merger
and the shareholder of the disappearing corporation was not a "sale"
for purposes of section 5,198 and (2) the subsequent distribution of Spec-

trum stock through strawmen representing a former control person would
involve application of the section 4(1) exemption for private investors

not involved in a public distribution of securities. 1 9 Schiffman consented to prepare the opinion letter as requested, apparently without
appreciable investigation into the background of the transaction. 20 0 A
few days after issuing the first letter, the attorney forwarded a second
letter, this time instructing against the use of his first letter in the sale

of the unregistered stock. The failure to either recall the first opinion
letter or incorporate a restriction against its use in that first letter was
itself a potential basis for negligence. 210' Nonetheless, it appears that
his letter was integral to the success of the distribution and, on this basis,

Schiffman would be liable for having aided and abetted the illegal distribution of unregistered securities.20 2
197. Spectrum's corporate counsel, Morton Berger, whose knowledge and involvement
appear to have been greater than defendant Schiffman's, was not named as a defendant
by the Commission. Berger issued a similar opinion, which formed the basis for the
Schiffman opinion letter, but declined to identify the specific individuals whose stock
was purportedly exempt and free trading. 489 F.2d at 538. One commentator has suggested that the district court's reluctance to proceed against Schiffman was in part explained by its evident belief that the SEC was after the wrong lawyer. See Freeman,
Opinion Letters and Professionalism, 1973 DuKE L.J. 371, 404-05. Nevertheless, the
Second Circuit declined to second-guess the Commission's decision to omit Berger. 489
F.2d at 538 n.7.
198. 489 F.2d at 537-39. SEC rule 133, 17 C.F.R. § 230.133 (1976), was rescinded
effective January 1, 1973 and has been replaced by rule 145, 17 C.F.R. § 230.145
(1976), which no longer recognizes a registration exeniption for securities issued in the
-course of a merger.
199. 489 F.2d at 537.
200. Id. at 538-39.
201. The court of appeals suggests that the proper course of action under circumstances which preclude thorough investigation is for "an attorney . . . [to] prevent the
illicit use of his opinion letter by prohibiting its utilization in the sale of unregistered
securities by a statement to that effect clearly appearing on the face of the letter." Id.
at 542. Schiffman failed to take such measures:
Schiffman, himself, realized that his opinion letter of December 4 could be used
in due course to sell unregistered securities and sought to prevent that use by his
subsequent letter to Doyen of December 8. This belated effort was ineffectual,
however, since the limitation expressed in the second letter could hardly affect the
potency of the December 4 opinion letter which remained unrestricted on its face.
Id.
202. In terms of the procedural posture of the case, the SEC's appeal was from the
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The application of a negligence standard in SEC enforcement
proceedings against the principal participants in a securities fraud was
well established in the Second Circuit prior to 1973.2O3 Spectrum is significant for having broadened the scope of that negligence standard in
two respects: First, the decision expressly approved of negligence as
a basis for liability under section 5 for violation of the registration requirements.20 4 Second, Spectrum represented the first instance of the
rule's application to a secondary participant, one who aided and abetted
a violation of the federal securities laws.20 5 It should be noted, however, that the SEC did allege that Schiffman's conduct rendered him
directly liable as a primary participant in the illegal distribution scheme.
The theory, which the court of appeals declined to consider, was that
Schiffman's participation was sufficient to qualify him as a statutory
underwriter. 06
The standard of conduct demanded of attorneys by the Spectrum
court could be characterized as a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, prior to the issuance of an opinion letter, which will foreseeably
facilitate the public sale of unregistered securities. This is in contrast
to a duty to inquire upon notice.20 r In this regard, it is necessary to
district court's denial of a preliminary injunction and refusal to even hold an evidentiary
hearing based on its judgment that aiding and abetting liability required culpability
greater than simple negligence for which there was no appreciable evidence. See SEC
v. Spectrum, Ltd., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FEE. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
93,631
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, with Judge Kaufman speaking
for the panel, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing consistent with a negligence standard. 489 F.2d at 542-43.
203. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir.
1972); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589, 596 (2d Cir. 1969); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur
Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
204. With regard to section 5 liability, the court said:
Although we have enunciated the negligence test principally in cases involving the
anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws,* the registration requirement embodied
in Section 5 is designed to perform the identical function of protecting investors
"by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to informed investment decisions.". . . Accordingly, we believe that, in a proceeding by the SEC
seeking prophylactic relief, we would be undermining this salutary mechanism by
an overly fine appraisal of conduct which contributes to its circumvention.
489 F.2d at 541 n.12 (citations omitted).
205. See Note, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1860, 1863-64. (1974).
206. The court refused to apply this theory of direct liability saying:
The term "underwriter" has been broadly defined to include anyone who directly
or indirectly participates in a distribution of securities from an "issuer" (Marder)
to the public.. . . Because the record is unclear, we decline to decide whether the
extent of Schiffman's alleged participation in the scheme would be sufficient to
qualify him as an "underwriter."
489 F.2d at 541 n.11 (citations omitted). The liability of an attorney as a "participant"
under section 12 is considered at notes 284-364 infra and accompanying text.
207. See Messer, supra note 185, at 454; Note, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1860, 1868 (1974).
See also SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968), discussed in notes 150-52
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consider the breadth of the Spectrum ruling. Is it limited to attorney
opinion letters in the context of the public distribution of unregistered
securities? Judge Kaufman, writing for the court in Spectrum cautions:
We could not conclude without emphasizing that the standard of culpability we find appropriate for the author of an opinion letter in an action
for injunctive relief only should not be construed to apply to more
peripheral participants in an illicit scheme or, for that matter, to criminal
prosecutions or private suits for damages. Those questions are not be2 08
fore us.
Much of the court's response to the argument that a negligence standard would impose too great a burden on the legal profession is framed
in terms of the critical role of attorney opinions in securities transactions
due to reliance by the investing public:
We do not believe . . . that imposition of a negligence standard with
respect to the conduct of a secondary participant is overly strict, at least
in the context of this case. The legal profession plays a unique and
pivotal role in the effective implementation of the securities laws.
Questions of compliance with the intricate provisions of these statutes
are ever present and the smooth functioning of the securities markets
will be seriously disturbed if the public cannot rely on the expertise proffered by an attorney when he renders an opinion on such matters.
In the distribution of unregistered securities, the preparation of an
opinion letter is too essential and the reliance of the public too high to
permit due diligence to be cast aside in the name of convenience. The
public trust demands more of its
legal advisers than "customary" activi209
ties which prove to be careless.
In view of the Second Circuit's later decision in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.,21 ° it is likely that the negligence rule will not be
confined to formal opinion letters by attorneys.21 1 However, the
Second Circuit has indicated that a predicate to secondary liability
under the Spectrum rule is that it be foreseeable that an attorney's conduct will further the illicit activities of the principals. 21 2 The events
in the Management Dynamics case centered around the sale of shares
by an inactive corporate issuer, Management Dynamics, Inc. (MD).
supra and accompanying text. One might argue, however, that Schiffman was on notice
under the circumstances involved.
208. 489 F.2d at 542.
209. Id. at 541-42.
210. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
211. Id. at 809-10.
212. Id. at 811.
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MD was being used by a land developer and builder as a "shell."
Levy, the defendant attorney, also occupied a position as director of
MD. It was Levy's dual position which raises questions about the
implications of the decision. As will be seen, the Second Circuit's
opinion did not rest on the attorney-director status, but only on
Levy's actions, which more closely resembled those of corporate counsel. Levy was alleged to have violated section 10(b) by his authorship or approval of a series of materially misleading letters and
press releases describing the agreement between MD and the builderdeveloper and by successfully soliciting shareholder ratification. The
court of appeals affirmed the district court's finding that Levy was
"responsible" for the misleading statements based on his actions. 213
No mention was made of Levy's status as counsel or director except
with regard to culpability where his professional familiarity with securi14
ties laws is cited in contradiction to Levy's claim of inadvertent error.2
Levy was also found to have violated the registration provisions of the
1933 Act by facilitating the offer for sale of unregistered MD shares.
This was allegedly accomplished by Levy's advising the MD Board of
Directors that the unregistered securities could be sold without restrictive legend and by his subsequent delivery of the shares to a broker
who unsuccessfully attempted to sell the stock.215 Once again, it was
Levy's status as a securities attorney which justified a finding of a "high
degree of carelessness,"21 6 and Spectrum is cited for the court's conclusion that "Levy's action thus enabled Watson [the broker] to offer the
MD shares for sale to anyone, despite the fact that they had never been
registered. His conduct was sufficient to justify issuance of the injunction against him. '21 7 While at one point the court speaks of Levy's
"authorizing" the delivery of the shares without restrictive legend,2 18
nothing further would justify distinguishing Management Dynamics
213. Id. at 804-05, 809.
214. The court found Levy's defense on this ground to be unfounded:
Levy's responsibility for these statements is clear, for he reviewed them and even
suggested changes in language which Barrett adopted. Nor can he cloak himself in
a professed ignorance regarding the real estate ventures, which he maintains led him
to rely on the information supplied by Barrett. As an experienced securities lawyer,
Levy surely should have known that contingencies cloud the horizon of almost every
business venture, and he should have asked Barrett to tell him about potential obstacles to the planned developments. Moreover, and particularly because of his expertise, he should have insisted that these possible impediments be identified in any
communication which described the projects.
Id. at 809.
215. Id.at 805, 810.
216. Id. at 810.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 805.
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from Spectrum as a director-attorney case. Levy's activities as drafter

and adviser could have been those of any corporate counsel. 219 While
the public reliance factor is arguably present in the case, there is a

strong indication that the rule in Spectrum will not be confined either to
opinion letters or to the illegal sale of unregistered securities.
Management Dynamics is also instructive on the scope of aiding and

abetting liability where one has knowledge that one's conduct provides
substantial assistance to the unlawful conduct of others. Nadino, a
broker actively making a market in MD stock, without any knowledge
of the merits of the company or the value of its stock, was relieved of

liability for having provided substantial assistance to the attempted distribution of unregistered MD shares because, unlike the attorney in

Spectrum, he neither knew nor could have surmised that an illegal distribution effort was underway not that his trading activity would lend
support to the scheme. 2 0 Of course, this limitation may prove illusory

as to attorneys, should they be held to a duty to investigate, as is suggested in Spectrum and Management Dynamics.2 1

B.

SEC v. Coffey: A Dissenting View
by the Sixth Circuit?

The question of differential review of SEC enforcement actions had
not been extensively considered among the circuits prior to Hochfelder.
222
The Seventh Circuit sided with the negligence rule in Spectrum.
What some have characterized as a dissenting view2 23 has emerged in
the Sixth Circuit's decision in SEC v. Coffey. 24
219. Cf. SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486 (2d Cir. 1968) (drafter); Keene Corp. v.
Weber, 394 F. Supp. 787, 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (adviser). But cf. SEC v. American
Associated Systems, Inc., 482 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130
(1974) (attorney-director). It appears that Judge Parker has also taken the view that
Management Dynamics is essentially an attorney qua attorney case in his recent opinion
in SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 649 n.14 (D.D.C. 1975).
220. 515 F.2d at 811.
221. For a discussion of the duty to investigate as considered in Spectrum, see note
207 supra and accompanying text. The duty to investigate is also suggested in Management Dynamics. See excerpt cited note 214 supra.
222. See SEC v. Dolnik, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974) (rejecting the view
in Coffey).
223. See SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH)
95,804 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 64849 (D.D.C. 1975); SEC v. Senex Corp., 399 F. Supp. 497, 506-07 (E.D. Ky. 1975),
aff'd, 534 F.2d 1240 (6th Cir. 1976).
224. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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Coffey involved an alleged fraud committed by agents for a company
seeking loans from the State of Ohio. According to the Commission,
Coffey, company vice president, was responsible both as a principal and
as an aider and abettor of the scheme to fraudulently obtain the state

financing. 225 With respect to primary liability, the court recognized
that "the standards of culpability may be lower in SEC injunctive suits
than in private damage actions, ' 228 but held, nevertheless, that the
Commission would have to prove that Coffey failed to disclose material
information on the company's financial condition by "willful or reckless
disregard for the truth. ' 227 Addressing the question of secondary
liability, the Sixth Circuit held that it would be necessary to prove that
Coffey, and the company president, King, "knowingly" allied themselves and assisted the fraudulent activities of the company's agents:
Without meaning to set forth an inflexible definition of aiding and abetting, we find that a person may be held as an aider-abettor only if some
other party has committed a securities law violation, if the accused party
had general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is
improper, and if the accused aider and abettor knowingly and substan228
tially assisted the violation.

This "flexible" standard permitted the court to reconcile its ruling with
that of the Second Circuit in Spectrum by emphasizing the factual differences in the two cases.220 Of course, the factual distinctions do not
adequately reconcile the clearly diverse legal standards applied by the
two courts.230 Yet, such an attempt to bring the two cases in line with
one another does not seem unworkable. Coffey's alleged secondary
liability was premised on inaction, i.e., failure to call a halt to the conduct of the company's agents. It might therefore be said, in recogni225. Id. at 1308-09.
226. Id. at 1314 (citing SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180
(1963), discussed at notes 239-48 infra and accompanying text).
227. 493 F.2d at 1314 (citing Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973)).
228. Id. at 1316.
229. The court distinguished Coffey and Spectrum as follows:
We view the Second Circuit's decision in [Spectrum] as correct on its facts.
There a lawyer was aware that his misleading opinion letter could be used to sell
unregistered securities and failed to take timely steps to prevent such use. We do
not believe that this application of a negligence standard to that situation compels
us to apply a negligence standard in the very different case we confront. Here
there must be some showing that Appellants were aware of the [agents'] alleged
misrepresentations. We note further that the attorney in Spectrum, Ltd. had committed three prior securities law violations, so that his argument of innocent knowledge was subject to doubt.
Id. at 1316 n.30.
230. Coffey has been widely cited as authority for the scienter requirement for liability under rule 10b-5. See, e.g., Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 n.13
(3rd Cir. 1975); Saltzman v. Zern, 407 F. Supp. 49, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1976); H. L. Federman & Co. v. Greenberg, 405 F. Supp. 1332, 1336 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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tion of Coffey's peripheral involvement, that his duty to intervene did
2
not arise absent actual knowledge or inquiry notice (recklessness). 11

The attorney in Spectrum was fully aware of the contemplated distribu-

tion of unregistered securities which would follow from his affirmative
conduct. Given the reliance factors so important to the rule in
Spectrum, failure to exercise due diligence was held to trigger injunctive
sanction. 23 2 Whatever the merits of this suggested analysis, it has not
The conclusion must be
yet been articulated in subsequent cases.2 3
that Coffey offers a dissenting view to that in Spectrum.2 34
C.

Viability of the DifferentialStandard of Liability:
A Question of Policy

The determination of whether the Commission's efforts to forestall
violations of the federal securities laws by seeking injunctive relief require proof of the scienter standard recognized in civil damage actions
by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder is inseparable from a consideration
of the purpose and effect of injunctive relief. Of these two factors,
effect is at the center of debate.23 5 No one disputes the importance
of the SEC's enforcement role in the protection of the public. 23 6 The
real controversy concerns the view that injunctive relief is a "mild prophylactic.""'
While the negligence rule was first applied in SEC enforcement proceedings under rule lOb-5 in SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,23 8 the
theory itself finds deeper roots in the earlier opinion of the Supreme
Court in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau.2s9 The government
231. See Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279 (9th Cir. 1971).
232. See discussion at note 209- supra and accompanying text.
233. Professor Ruder has offered a similar perspective focusing on the nature of the
occupations held by the alleged wrongdoers in Coffey and Spectrum. See Ruder, Factors
Determining the Degree of Culpability Necessary for Violation of-the Federal Securities
Law in Information Transmission Cases, 32 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 571, 590 (1975).
234. See notes 208-12 supra and accompanying text.
235. See Mathews, supra note 28, at 106-10.
236. See generally SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
237. As the court in SEC v. Coffey observed:
Appellants argue that the District Court opinion tars them with the finding that
they committed a fraud, thus jeopardizing their right to earn a livelihood. The SEC
asserts . . .that injunctive relief is merely a "mild prophylactic," which requires
"only that a defendant obey provisions of the law that he was already obliged to
obey."
493 F.2d at 1310. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963).
238. 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968).
239. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Capital Gains is cited by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder with respect to the unresolved issues of a differential standard for injunctive relief.
425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
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sought an injunction under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940,240
which contains language similar to that found in section 10(b), to compel a registered investment adviser to disclose to its customers its practice of purchasing securities, recommending investments in those securities by its clients, and then selling out its own holdings at a profit
on the strength of the market rise engendered by the clients' purchases.
In response to the defendant firm's contention that an injunction for
fraudulent practices would not lie in the absence of proof of fraudulent
intent, the Supreme Court ruled:
Congress, in empowering the courts to enjoin any practice which operates "as a fraud or deceit" upon a client, did not intend to require proof
of intent to injure and actual injury to the client. Congress intended
the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 to be construed like other securities legislation "enacted for the purpose of avoiding frauds," not techni24
cally and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. '
It should be noted at the outset that the Capital Gains opinion does
not purport to sanction a negligence standard. It only abandons the
element of fraudulent intent. The Court's paramount concern was with
a course of conduct inevitably creating a conflict of interest and which,
in view of the fiduciary relationship between investment adviser and
client, compelled disclosure of the firm's dubious practice without
necessity of proving bad faith or some form of scienter. This can
hardly be deemed a departure from even the common law, 2 42 as the
Court itself observed. 243 Fbr this reason, one observer has argued that
the- decision in Capital Gains merely recognizes the long-established
doctrine of constructive fraud. 44 Moreover, the Supreme Court's oftcited reference to injunctive relief as a "mild prophylactic" is expressly
premised on the nature of the relief sought under the facts of that
2 45

case.

On the other hand, it must be said that the Supreme Court's subsequent treatment of Capital Gains has been more expansive. In a series
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (1970).
241. 375 U.S. at 195.
242. See generally PROSSER, supra note 127, at 687-89.
243. 375 U.S. at 192-95.
244. See Kohn v. American Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 355, 282 (3d Cir.) (Adams,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
245. The CapitalGains Court said of injunctive relief:
This is a suit for a preliminary injunction in which the relief sought is . . . (a]
"mild prophylactic," . . . requiring a fiduciary to disclose to his clients, not all his
security holdings, but only his dealings in recommended securities just before and
after the issuance of his recommendations.
375 U.S. at 192-93.
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of high court decisions expanding the scope of section 10(b) ,240
Capital Gains has been continually cited for the broad proposition that
the remedial purposes of the securities acts require flexible interpretation of their provisions. Significantly, the Commission's expanding argument ultimately ran out of gas in Hochfelder where the Supreme
Court would not accept Capital Gains as authority for ignoring the
terms of section 10(b) ,247 although the Court offered an oblique and
passing reference to the Commission's "arsenal of flexible enforcement
24
powers.1
There are persuasive reasons for a general principle that the
elements of fraud should vary with the nature of the relief sought and
the relationship between the litigants. To the extent that the injunction
merely commands cessation of a questionable course of conduct, the
consequences are not comparable to an award of damages, or even
rescission. This is all the more true where the action is taken against
a fiduciary acting in the role of a principal. Yet, even if the Supreme
Court should ultimately approve of the general rule as announced in
Texas Gulf Sulfur,249 this would not necessarily require application of
the rule to secondary liability of attorneys to the investing public
with whom there is no professional relationship. Any decision to limit
the scope of the negligence rule in Commission enforcement actions
could justifiably turn on the more serious consequences incurred by attorneys and other professionals as a result of being the subject of an
injunction.
The right to practice before the Commission is indispensable to a
member of the securities bar. Forfeiture of this right may be a collateral sanction in the wake of an unsuccessful defense to an enforcement action. The conditions for practicing before the Commission are
embodied in rule 2 of the Commission Rules of Practice 25° which pro246. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
247. 425 U.S. at 200-01.
248. Id. at 195.
249. 401 F.2d 833, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
250. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2 (1976). For a discussion of SEC disciplinary powers and
sanctions, see, e.g., Gonson, Disciplinary Proceedings and Other Remedies Available to
the SEC, 30 Bus. LAw. 191 (1975); Johnson, The Expanding Responsibilities of Attorneys in Practice Before the SEC: Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e) of the
Commission's Rules of Practice, 25 MERcER L. REv. 637 (1974); Mathews, supra note
28; Mathews, Effective Defense of SEC Investigations: Laying the Foundation for
Successful Disposition of Subsequent Civil, Administrative and Criminal Proceedings,
24 EMoRY L.J. 567 (1975); Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 DUKE L.J.
969.
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vides for suspension, disbarment or other sanctions 251 when an attorney
is found to be unqualified, guilty of unethical conduct, or to have wilfully violated or wilfully aided and abetted the violation of the securities laws.252 The SEC is further empowered to automatically disqualify
an attorney from practice before it as a result of having been subject
to a permanent injunction sought by the Commission in an enforcement
proceeding for violation of the securities laws. 53
Temporary suspension may be entered without a hearing. The
attorney is then required to petition for lifting of the suspension. If
he fails to do so within the brief period allotted, the suspension becomes permanent. 254 This follows regardless of whether the injunction
was entered by consent decree (with formal denial of the charges) or
by litigation on the merits. 255 The effect of the court order is to bar
relitigating the adverse findings on the question of the attorney's unlawful conduct. The rule 2(e) hearing will be limited to factors offered
in mitigation of the ultimate disciplinary sanctions by the Commis256
sion.
The anomalous result is that a negligent lawyer may well suffer more
serious penalties than a client who knowingly violated the securities
laws.2" 7 This unfair and unwarranted dilemma for attorneys should be
resolved by abandonment of the rule in Spectrum, or, more practicably,
258
by amendment to the Commission Rules of Practice.
251. There is a trend toward lesser sanctions in settlement cases, such as an attorney
agreeing to be subject to peer review. See e.g., SEC v. Georgia Dynamics, [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCII) If 95,565 (D.D.C. 1976).
252. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1) (1976).
253. Id. § 201.2(e)(3).
254. Id. § 201.2(e) (3) (ii).
255. Id. § 201.2(e)(3)(iv).
256. Id.
257. See Lipman, supra note 10, at 447 n.61; Mathews, supra note 28, at 106-10;
Small, supra note 10, at 1198 n.35. By contrast, the Rules of Professional Conduct promulgated by the California State Bar Association subject an attorney to sanctions for
incompetence only where "willful or habitual." CAL. STATE BAR Assoc., RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT No. 6-101.
258. Recently in SEC v. Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 55 (2d Cir. 1976), the Second Circuit, in denying injunctive relief, acknowledged the serious collateral consequences which may be suffered by a broker-dealer firm as a result of successful Commission enforcement proceedings and balanced this against the firm's minimal culpability.
A notable development has been the action brought by an accounting firm, Touche,
Ross & Co., against the SEC challenging the authority of the Commission to discipline
securities professionals pursuant to rule 2(e). See Touche, Ross & Co. v. SEC,
[Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 195,742 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
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D. Impact of Hochfelder upon Subsequent
SEC EnforcementProceedings
The first reference to the survival of the Spectrum rule came in brief
dictum by a district court in SEC v. Galaxy Foods.25 9 Less than two
months later, in SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.,260 the first successful challenge was directed to the continued viability of Spectrum after Hochfelder. The district court concluded that the rationale of the Supreme
Court's decision, i.e., the language and legislative history of section
10(b), precludes a differential standard in favor of SEC enforcement
actions which could be justified only on the very policy grounds which
the Supreme Court had refused to consider. 2 1' There is much force
to this argument. Indeed, in its amicus curiae brief in Hochfelder, the
SEC itself argued in favor of equivalent standards for private actions
and Commission proceedings for injunctive relief, albeit in favor of a
negligence standard. 62 And, in a statement which may yet come back
to haunt the two dissenting justices in Hochfelder, it was argued that
26 3
rule 1Ob-5 standards should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity.
Nevertheless, it appears that the Second Circuit may be prepared to
stand by its decision in Spectrum. In its most recent statement in SEC
v. Universal Major Industries Corp.,264 a three-judge panel refused to
overrule the Spectrum line of cases as a consequence of Hochfelder.
The court's statements appear as dictum preceding affirmance of the
district court's finding of fraud. 65 While noting the lack of unanimity
among the circuits, the court did not offer a reasoned analysis for its
position.266 This certainly will not be the last word in view of the
SEC's pending appeal in Bausch & Lomb.
The Third Circuit appears to have sanctioned a negligence standard
in enforcement actions for injunctive relief in SEC v. World Radio
Mission, Inc.26 7 observing that "[i]f proposed conduct is objectively
within the Congressional definition of injurious to the public, good faith,
however much it may be a defense to a private suit for past actions
259. 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1245 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
260. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,722 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
261. Id. at 90,510 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 214 n.33).
262. Brief for Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae at 17, Ernst
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
263. 425 U.S. at 217.
264. [Current] FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,804 (2d Cir. 1976).
265. For the decision of the district court, see SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp.,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,229 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
266. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 95,804, at 90,916 (2d Cir. 1976).
267. [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,751 (3d Cir. 1976).
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. . .should make no difference. '2 8 Also adopting a negligence standard was the district court for the Northern District of California in SEC
v. Geotek.269 The basis for the ruling was that, inasmuch as the
Supreme Court left the issue open, the court would follow the preHochfelder "majority" rule of the Second and Seventh Circuits recognizing negligence as a basis for injunctive relief.2 70 Finally, there was
a similar expression by a New Jersey district court judge in SEC v.
Trans Jersey Bancrop,27 ' which refused to permit certain defendants to
assert a cross-claim for damages as to which a different standard,
scienter, would apply.
V.

ATTORNEY LIABILITY UNDER SECURITIES LAWS

NOT REQUIRING SCIENTER
A major consideration expressed by the Supreme Court in Hochfelder was the need to construe section 10(b) in the context of the
entire body of federal securities regulations established in the 1933 and
1934 Acts. 272 The court found persuasive support for the scienter requirement under section 10(b) by contrasting the language of that section with the carefully crafted language of the 1933 Act liability provisions, sections 11273 and 12,274 which expressly stipulate as to "whether

recovery was to be premised on knowing or intentional conduct, negligence, or entirely innocent mistake.

' 27 5

While neither section 11270

nor section 12277 requires proof of scienter, both are subject to significant procedural restrictions 273 and to limitations on the scope of their
coverage, i.e., as to those classes of persons who may bring actions and
268. Id. at 90,661 (citation omitted).
269. [Current] FED.SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,756 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
270. Id. at 90,723-24.
271. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,818 (D.N.J. 1976).
272. 425 U.S. at 206-11.
273. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970).
274. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
275. 425 U.S. at 207.
276. Discussed at notes 370-72 infra and accompanying text.
277. Discussed at note 288 infra and accompanying text.
278. The Hochfelder Court outlined those restrictions:
Section 11(e) of the 1933 Act, for example, authorizes the court to require a plaintiff bringing a suit under §11, §12(2), or §15 thereof to post a bond for costs, including attorneys' fees and in specified circumstances to assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation. Section 13 specifies a statute of limitations of one year
from the time the violation was or should have been discovered, in no event to exceed three years from the time of offer or sale, applicable to actions brought under
§11, §12(2), or §15.
425 U.S. at 209-10.
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those persons subject to liability thereunder.27 9 Section 10(b), by con-

trast, is not so circumscribed with respect to procedure 8 0 or to the
scope of its coverage. 28 1 Therefore, to acquiesce in a negligence stand-

ard in section 10(b) actions would effectively nullify the liability provisions under the 1933 Act in cases of concurrent scope.282 The experience in those circuits which, prior to Hochfelder, opted for a negli10(b) suggests that the Court's appregence standard under section
28 1
hension was well founded.
The question which now arises is, under what circumstances will
attorneys, particularly those fulfilling a purely professional role, be
liable under alternative provisions of the two securities acts which do
not currently compel proof of scienter?
A.

Section 12 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933

Section 12 of the 1933 Act2 4 is the most significant source of potential liability of attorneys in the sale of securities. Divided into two sub-

sections, section 12(1) establishes liability for any person who offers
or sells a security in violation of the registration requirements of section

5 of the 1933 Act28" and section 12(2) provides for liability for those
who, in the process of offering or selling a security, make false or misleading statements (or omissions) in a prospectus or by oral communication. Common to both provisions is a privity requirement limiting
liability to those who sell or attempt to sell securities.280 The effect
279. See discussion of the scope of liability under section 11 at note 366 infra and
accompanying text and the discussion of liability under section 12 at notes 289-302 infra
and accompanying text.
280. The Supreme Court noted, for example, that the appropriate state statute of limitations would control actions under section 10(b) and that these have generally been
longer than the one year provision in section 13 of the 1933 Act. 425 U.S. at 210 n.29.
281. Section 10(b) proscribes certain forms of fraudulent misconduct by "any person"
and requires only that the misconduct occur "inconnection with the purchase or sale
of any security." Thus, section 10(b) is not subject to a privity limitation. See BROMnERG, supranote 94, § 8.5(511).
282. See Stewart v. Bennett, 359 F. Supp. 878 (D.Mass. 1973), where Judge Tauro
discusses this problem which he characterizes as an "end run." The Court held that
"a purchaser of securities in an allegedly fraudulent transaction may proceed under lOb5 even though he might also have a section 11 remedy available to him." Id. at 886.
283. For Ninth Circuit examples, see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961);
Matheson v. Armbrust, 284 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 870 (1961).
284. 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970).
285. Id. § 77e.
286. Excluded from this discussion is the section 15 provision governing the liability
of control persons for the conduct of subordinates in violation of section 11 or 12. Id.
§ 77o. While section 15 expands the scope of liability under the 1933 Act generally,
it has little importance to the liability of attorneys. See, e.g., SEC v. Fifth Ave. Coach
Lines, Inc., 289 F. Supp. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
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of this privity limitation on the liability of attorneys is considered below.2 87 What distinguishes these two subsections of section 12 beyond
the substantive basis of liability is their standard of liability. The sale
or offer to sell non-exempt and unregistered securities by the requisite
jurisdictional means in violation of section 5 subjects the seller to strict
liability under section 12(1). On the other hand, the antifraud proscription of section 12(2) is effective only as against those sellers who fail to
sustain a defense of due diligence, thus establishing a negligence stand8
ard.Z 8
One inevitable effect of the Supreme Court's decision to impose a
scienter standard in rule 1Ob-5 actions will be to create pressure to expand the scope of liability under the less onerous liability provisions
of section 12. The potential for expansion lies in two areas: the "participants" doctrine and aiding and abetting liability.
1.

"Participants" Doctrine

It has always been understood that the scope of section 12 liability
("any person who offers or sells a security") is not limited solely to
those parties who are technically the sellers or offerors of the subject
securities "in the mystical sense of passing 'title.' "289 Proceeding from
the broad definition of the terms "sale" and "offer for sale" in section
2(3) of the 1933 Act,290 and the remedial purposes of section 12, it
is generally acknowledged that the scope of section 12 liability includes
29
those who "participate" in the solicitation and sale of securities. '
Those who have been held to be participants for purposes of section
12 liability include brokers, 292 directors and officers of an issuer, 29 8 pro287. See notes 303-52 infra and accompanying text.

288. Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
289. 3 L. Loss, SECURrrIES RFGuLATiON 1713 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
Loss]. See In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1973).

290. Section 2(3) provides: "The term 'offer to sell', 'offer for sale', or 'offer' shall
include every attempt or offer to dispose of, or solicitation of an offer to buy, a security
or interest in a security, for value." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(3) (1970).
291. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th
Cir. 1971); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046, 1052-53 (2d Cir. 1969).
292. See In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), in
which the court said: "Brokers have repeatedly been included within the coverage of
both parts of § 12, whether the broker represents both parties to the transaction or only
the seller." Id. at 379. See also authorities cited id.; Loss, supra note 289, at 171314. But see Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F. Supp. 282, 287 (E.D. La. 1974),
a[f'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975) (buyer's broker held not to be a participant where

merely effecting unsolicited transaction).
293. Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
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moters,2 4 and attorneys.2 95
Two questions must be asked. First, what is the proper test for
determining, in general, whether a person's conduct is sufficiently involved in the solicitation or sale of securities to become a participant?
The leading case which best articulates the standard which appears to
have governed the vast majority of decisions regarding the scope of the
participant doctrine is Hill York Corp. v. American International Franchises, Inc. 296 The task is to formulate a workable compromise "between the antiquated 'strict privity' concept and the overbroad 'participation' concept which would hold all those liable who participated in
events leading up to the transaction." '97 Seeking to quantify that
' 2 98
degree of participation which might be characterized as "substantial,
the Fifth Circuit, in Hill York, adopted the test first enunciated in an
earlier case, Lennerth v. Mendenhall:2 99 "[Tlhe line of demarcation
must be drawn in terms of cause and effect: To borrow a phrase from
the law of negligence, did the injury to the plaintiff flow directly and
proximately from the actions of this particular defendant?" 00 The use
of the phrase "directly and proximately" unfortunately obscures the traditional distinction in tort law between the competing tests of proximate
causation: direct causation and foreseeability. Further confusion is
engendered by the reference to "injury" instead of the subject transaction. Must the participant be directly connected to the events which
rendered the transaction illegal? Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit's
citation from the Lennerth decision omits an important passage:
But for the presence of the defendant Roger in the negotiations preceding the sale, could the sale have been consummated? If the answer is
in the negative, and we find that the transaction could never have
REP. (CCH)

1

91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).

294. Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises, Inc., 448 F.2d 680 (5th Cir.
1971).
295. See cases discussed at notes 303-52 infra and accompanying text.
296. 448 F.2d 680, 692-93 (5th Cir. 1971). For subsequent cases explaining the rule
in Hill York, see, e.g., Ayers v. Wolfinbarger, 491 F.2d 8, 13-14 (5th Cir. 1974); In
re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also
note 302 infra and accompanying text.
297. 448 F.2d at 692.
298. This term is employed by the court in Canizaro v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 370 F.
Supp. 282, 288 (E.D.La. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1975).
299. 234 F. Supp. 59, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1964). Interestingly, the district court's formu-

lation proceeded from the analysis of the court in Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co.,
[1957-1961 Transfer Binder] FED.SEc. L.

REP.

(CCH)

91,034 (S.D.N.Y. (1961), the

first reported case concerning attorney liability as a "seller" under section 12.
man is discussed at notes 314-15 infra and accompanying text.
300. 448 F.2d at 693.

Wonne-

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10

materialized without the efforts of that defendant, we must find him
301
guilty.
It thus appears that the test for participation, at least as formulated in
Lennerth, may more closely resemble causation in fact than proximate
causation with respect to the transaction. This is a broad test which,
unless otherwise limited, promises to cast a wide net, inevitably involving attorneys, particularly where it is the advice, or opinion letter, or
drafting by counsel that is a necessary link in the transactional chain
of events. Whether misled by the omitted language from Lennerth or
by the judgment that Hill York modified the test formulated in
Lennerth, subsequent courts have characterized the rule in Hill York
as a proximate cause test.30 2 This appears to be the better view.
The second question which must be addressed is under what circumstances will an attorney's professional role rise to the level of "participation." One of the earliest cases to consider attorney liability under
section 12 was Nicewarner v. Bleavin, 303 where the rule of "but for"
causation was apparently accepted as the standard for participation. In
that case, it was conceded that counsel's role was necessary to the consummation of the unlawful sale.304 At the same time, however, the
attorney's conduct remained within the bounds of his profession. 305
The attorney did not, in the judgment of the trial court, participate in
the solicitationof plaintiff's purchase because, contrary to plaintiff's version of events, "it [was] . . . highly probable that [plaintiff] had

agreed to make the investment before he ever reached [the attorney]
and that the visit to the latter's office was merely for the purpose of
301. 234 F. Supp. at 65 (emphasis added).
302. See, e.g., Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th Cir. 1973); Wassel
v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1361 (D.Md. 1975).
303. 244 F. Supp. 261 (D. Colo. 1965).

304. Consideration of the facets of the attorney's role made it
clear that Hudson's involvement with this venture was more than casual. From the
beginning, it was contemplated that his part in the development and promotion of
the timer would be substantial, and it has been despite the fact that he received
no portion of Lingenfelter's royalty interest. At every turn in the testing of the
timer, in the printing of promotional literature, in the negotiation for manufacture
or distribution of the timer, in Colorado, in Canada, in Florida, Hudson was present; but always in the capacity of attorney for Lingenfelter. Hudson drafted
the assignment from Lingenfelter to Bleavins. The assignment from Bleavins to
Nicewarner, also a Hudson product, was adopted as the standard form and printed
by Lingenfelter. Moreover, Hudson had discussed with Lingenfelter and Bleavins
the tax advantages of assigning fractional interests.
Id. at 266.
305. The court concluded that "while it appears that the sale would not have been
consummated without the services of some attorney, the evidence fails to establish that
Hudson did more than serve as an attorney." Id.

1977]

SECURITIES MALPRACTICE

formalizing the transaction.

30° 6

The court thus excluded from consid-

eration the attorney's pivotal involvement as counsel in the scheme pre-

ceding the subject transaction and found that the evidence did not support the asserted involvement in the actual solicitation. The fact that
counsel might have prevented the sale was held not sufficient for liabil-

ity under section 12.307
There are two limitations on the scope of participation which would
prove important to potential liability of attorneys. First, the degree of
participation must be substantial, beyond that described as causation in
fact. 08 Second, as Nicewarner suggests, participation may be qualified
by the nature of one's contributory efforts, i.e., solicitation. Because
the extent of the first limitation is still in doubt,30 9 this discusssion will

focus on the nature of those activities which qualify as participation. 10
The Nicewarner court's bright line test, based on the distinction be-

tween the customary practice of law and solicitation, proves difficult in
application. Certainly, there are cases where counsel actually sells for
himself or for the account of others, 311 or directly solicits the unlawful
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See discussion in note 337 infra and accompanying text.
309. See notes 301-02 supra and accompanying text.
310. In considering the lawyer-participant cases, one further factor may be added
to the equation. While the doctrine of participation is generally applied without distinction to both sections 12(1) and 12(2), see Hill York Corp. v. American Int'l Franchises,
Inc., 448 F.2d 680, 692 (5th Cir. 1971), Hill York has suggested a possibly narrower
scope of participation under section 12(1). Id. at 692. See generally Loss, supra note
289, at 1712-20 (citing Wonneman v. Stratford Sec. Co., [1957-1961 Transfer Binder]
91,034 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)). See also Wilko v. Swan, 127
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
This narrower application has support in one sense: Unlike section 12(1), there is
no privity limitation under section 12(2) where the defendant's misstatement is actuated
by scienter. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1298 (2d Cir. 1973). The availability of the section 4(1) exemption from liability for violations of section 5 for those
not an underwriter or issuer does not, in the broad definition of "underwriter," appear
to further limit the participation doctrine under section 12(1). "Underwriter" has been
defined as
any person who has purchased from an issuer with a view to, or offers or sells for
an issuer in connection with, the distribution of any security, or participates or
has a direct or indirect participation in any such undertaking, or participates or has
a participation in the direct or indirect underwriting of any such undertaking.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1970) (emphasis added).
While it might be said that this difference in the standards of culpability might justify
a narrow interpretation under section 12(1), the lawyer-participant cases, which commonly involve that section, do not, with the possible exception of the Wonneman case,
support such a meaningful distinction. See Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y.
1955); Moore v. Gorman, 75 F. Supp. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
311. See, e.g., SEC v. A.G. Bellin Sec. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 233, 235-37 (S.D.N.Y.
1959).
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sale of securities. "12 Counsel may also become a participant by virtue
of occupying an executive position with the issuer.3 13 On the other
hand, an attorney qua attorney defense succeeded in Wonneman v.
Stratford Securities Co.,3 14 in which counsel performed legal work inci-

dent to reviving a dormant corporation with a view to obtaining a pre1933 exemption, revamping the capital structure, and recommending

two directors and a transfer agent. The attorney's closest contact
with the actual distribution of unregistered securities was through oral
advice concerning the purported exemption given to the controlling
shareholder.3 15
At this point, the line drawn in Nicewarner and Wonneman begins
to blur. In Katz v. Amos Treat & Co.,'- 6 an attorney for a brokerage

house and special counsel to the issuer was charged with violations of
section 12.3 7 Counsel did not take the initiative in the offering. The
shares of stock were neither transferred by or through the attorney nor
did he benefit monetarily from the transaction. Nevertheless, the attorney was held to be a party to the solicitation because "the evidence
clearly warranted the inference that . . . he had not simply answered

[the purchaser's] questions, but had placed [the broker] in a position
to tackle [the purchaser] for the money. '3 18 Certainly, Katz maintains
the focus on solicitation and, unlike Nicewarner, the attorney's assur-

ances regarding the merits of the proposed offering appear to have
312. See, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1089 n.3, 109092, 1095-97 (2d Cir. 1972), discussed at notes 159-62 supra and accompanying text.
313. See, e.g., SEC v. American Associated Systems, Inc., 482 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974).
314. 23 F.R.D. 281 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
315. The contrast with SEC v. A.G. Bellin Sec. Corp., 171 F. Supp. 233, 235-37
(S.D.N.Y. 1959) is instructive. Both schemes involved reviving a corporate shell with
the defendant attorneys handling all legal work and advising on legality of the proposed
transactions. However, in Bellin, attorney Josephson proceeded to direct the marketing
of the securities for which conduct he was held to be a statutory underwriter. Compare
SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975), with SEC v. Century
Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) %93,232
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
316. 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1969).
317. Violations of both sections 12(1) and 12(2) were alleged in Katz. Judge
Friendly's opinion gives no indication of a stricter standard for section 12(1) and, indeed, does not consider the section 4(1) exemption, i.e., whether Wofsey was a statutory
underwriter.
318. 411 F.2d at 1053. The court cited Nicewarner by way of contrast. Id. The
court also dismissed the action as to a director and officer of the issuer whose knowledge
of the sale and signing of the stock certificate was held not to rise to the threshold
of participation. Id.
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been a significant factor.3 1 9 In this sense, Katz adheres to the rule suggested in Nicewarner and Wonneman. At the same time, it must be
said that the indirect involvement in solicitation by the attorney in Katz
20
represents a more expansive treatment of the participant theory.3

This expanded view is amply supported by the Second Circuit's later

decision in SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc.3 21 This enforcement
action 12 2 followed in the wake of an unsuccessful offer to sell unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act. The court
of appeals upheld the district court's finding that Levy, attorney and
director3 23 for the issuer, proposed the ill-fated offering, advised the
board of directors of its legality and delivered the shares to the broker,
thus enabling the latter to solicit offers to buy and subjecting the attorney to a preliminary injunction. Levy's conduct was consistent with his
role as corporate counsel and seems one more step removed from solicitation. On the other hand, the degree of Levy's influence on the
events was so decisive that any other result would have seemed
anomalous. 2 4
In a similar vein is the Tenth Circuit's decision in Andrews v.

Blue.325 Plaintiff sought rescission of his investment in a joint venture
for the development of real estate. Subsequent to a merger with
another corporate entity, the venture was incorporated. Contrary to

representations by defendants and their attorney, Austin, 326 plaintiff's
319. Id. at 1052. To compare the circumstances in Nicewarner, see note 306 supra
and accompanying text.
320. This is the view taken by the district court in In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). Indeed, Katz is cited in Lorber v. Beebe,
407 F. Supp. 279 (S.D.N.Y. 1975):
[O]ver the years, exceptions to [the section 12] strict privity requirement have
developed and, in certain carefully defined instances, liability has been extended to
more than the plaintiff's immediate seller [including] . . . those who have actively
participated in the sale, either as an aider and abettor or as a co-conspirator.
Id. at 287-88.
321. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
322. While the Commission's action was not brought under the civil liability provision of section 12, reserved for private litigants, there is no indication that directly proceeding under the requirements of section 5 should yield a different scope of liability,
particularly in view of the section 4(1) exemption. See note 310 supra and accompanying text.
323. The fact of Levy's dual position does not seem to have influenced the outcome.
See generally notes 213-19 supra and accompanying text.
324. The difficulty in assessing the implications of the Management Dynamics case
is that the court does not directly confront the issue of participation.
325. 489 F.2d 367 (10th Cir. 1973).
326. Austin, the defendant attorney in Andrews v. Blue, was originally an investing
participant in the joint venture. However, upon incorporation and prior to the merger,
Austin was bought out. His activities thereafter were confined to his role as corporate
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investment was effectively diminished and frozen by issuance of restricted stock. In sustaining a section 12(1) claim, the court of appeals
held that the issuance of unregistered stock in connection with the merger was not exempt as a private placement.327
Attorney Austin's second line of defense was section 4(1), exempting persons not issuers or underwriters from section 5 registration requirements. This argument was rejected by the Tenth Circuit which
upheld the lower court's finding that the attorney had participated in
28
his clients' acquisition of merger shares with a view to redistribution.
The precise nature of Austin's conduct is not spelled out but it is clear
that his actions were strictly in the scope of his role as attorney.120 It is
thus apparent that attorneys can no longer rely on the talismanic immunity of their professional role in the illegal sale of unregistered
securities by a client.
The most significant recent decision came in Wassel v. Eglowsky, 330
a section 12(1) action for damages arising out of the unregistered redistribution of securities by a control person and his agents.331 These
defendants, as third party plaintiffs, sought indemnification 3 2 and contribution against Goldman, their attorney, who curiously was not named
in the main action. 3 3 Since the basis for the contribution claims required a finding that the attorney was a joint tortfeasor,3 34 the court's
counsel. Id. at 371. His earlier involvement as a principal does not appear to have
affected the question of law.
327. Id. at 374.
328. Id.
329. There is evidence that Austin corresponded on behalf of his clients, the other
defendants, both with plaintiff and with the second corporation in the merger, each
time regarding the extent of plaintiff's rights and interests. Id. at 371-72. This is
the extent of the court's recital of Austin's conduct.
330. 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975).
331. Defendants' sole defense was the section 4(1) exemption which failed because
a control person is treated as an issuer under section 2(11) for purposes of determining
the availability of the section 4(1) exemption. Id. at 1361-62. The other defendants
actively participated in the solicitation and sale of the subject securities. Id. at 1362.
332. The claim for indemnification against Goldman failed because he was no more
culpable than defendants themselves. Id. at 1366.
333. It appears that plaintiff, a non-lawyer, originally brought the action pro se. Id.
at 1356. The complaint suffered from several drafting deficiencies, judging from the
amendments filed by plaintiffs first attorney, retained shortly after the commencement
of the litigation. The section 12(1) claim did not appear until a subsequent amended
complaint was filed by a second attorney hired to replace the first. Id. at 1357. Presumably, the one-year statute of limitations under section 13 of the 1933 Act barred
any action against Goldman by this time. Id. at 1370 n.75. The fact that Wassel
was apparently not aware, initially, of Goldman's role suggests the distance between
Goldman and the events culminating in the eventual subject transaction.
334. Id. at 1367.
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analysis proceeds as if the attorney were named as a defendant.

The

evidence was conclusive that Goldman's role in the redistribution

scheme ceased entirely prior to the solicitation and negotiation phase
preceding the subject transaction with Wassel, the plaintiff. 335 The

court's ultimate finding that Goldman was a participant in the sale
therefore eschewed, by
implication, the solicitation requirement sug33
gested in Nicewarner. 1
Nonetheless, it was held that Goldman was a "key person" whose
extensive involvement in laying the legal groundwork for the redistribu-

tion scheme rendered his actions the "proximate cause"3 37 of the trans335. Id. at 1346. With respect to the rule lOb-5 claim for failure to reveal material
information to Wassel during negotiations, defendants Eglowsky and Stillerman conceded that Goldman neither caused nor participated in their fraudulent nondisclosure.
Id. at 1365 n.65.
336. See discussion at notes 303-07 supra and accompanying text.
337. 399 F. Supp. at 1369. The court thus adopted the Hill York view requiring
more than simple "but for" causation. Id. at 1361. See notes 296-302 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Hill York.
The district court had earlier concluded that Goldman's role was a necessary or "but
for" element in the chain of events. 399 F. Supp. at 1369. This conclusion was held
to warrant establishment of personal jurisdiction and the propriety of venue in Maryland
under section 22(a) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1970), despite Goldman's
never having entered the state nor even having contacted persons within that jurisdiction. In this connection, it should be pointed out that the numerous cases under section
22(a) purporting to find attorneys to be "participants" in a sale taking place within the
forum jurisdiction for purposes of venue and jurisdiction are inapposite authority in the
context of section 12 liability. See, e.g., Keene Corp. v. Weber, 394 F. Supp. 787, 790
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208, 1213-16 (W.D. Va. 1975); SEC
v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 360 F. Supp. 284, 291-94 (D.D.C. 1973); Black &
Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc., 333 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (D. Ore. 1971); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The venue cases arise at the threshold of the proceedings and are resolved on the
basis of the broad allegations in the complaints. Courts have almost uniformly rejected
objections to venue, requiring only an allegation of common scheme, occurrence of a
material act in furtherance of the scheme within the forum, and a general allegation
of the defendant attorney's "participation". See, e.g., Sohns v. Dahl, 392 F. Supp. 1208,
1214-15 (W.D. Va. 1975). Keene Corp. v. Weber is the only case discovered which
did not sustain the venue allegations. Whether attributable to the fact that the case
had proceeded through the deposition phase of discovery, the court appears to have
decided the question on the basis of the merits of liability. 394 F. Supp. at 790. The
court's opinion is of interest for its denunciation of plaintiff's
gossamer and contrived allegations of "participation" by [the attorney which the
court found] . .. indicative of an unfortunate tendency, which has become all too
prevalent, to proceed on speculative assumptions in the absence of a sound factual
foundation, against professional men as aiders and abettors, for the supposed in
terrorem effect thereof due to the potentially coercive impact of such a suit on their
professional status and reputation.
Id. at 789. The "knowing participation" venue standard in Keene was recently criticized
as aberrant authority in Klepper Krop, Inc. v. Handford, 411 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D.
Neb. 1976).
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action and therefore exposed him to liability as a participant to the
sale.33 8 The district court made the following findings with respect to
Goldman's specific involvement: (1) as counsel to the issuer and a
protagonist in a series of events involving the issuance of stock in order
to secure desperately needed financing 339 followed by a takeover of
control by outsiders,340 Goldman knew of the intention of the main defendants, as controlling persons, to publicly redistribute their restricted
holdings; 341 (2) in order to facilitate the envisioned transactions, Goldman agreed to issue an opinion letter to the transfer agent advising that
the securities were free-trading and instructing the removal of the restrictive legend then appearing on the stock certificates; 4 2 and (3)
fully aware that those acquiring the shares during the initial transfer
of the securities for later redistribution were relying on his professional
assurance of the free-trading status of the stock, 34 3 the attorney
rendered the opinion and authorized removal of the restrictive legend.3 4 4 On this basis, the court concluded: "Goldman did much more
than simply serve as an attorney for [the issuer] herein. Compare
Black & Company v. Nova-Tech, Inc., . . . with Nicewarner v. Bleavins. . . . Goldman was one of the key persons in bringing about and
making possible the sale . . .-.

The court in Wassel v. Eglowsky would at first glance appear to have
followed the Nicewarner view that an attorney qua attorney will not be
liable as a participant in a transaction in violation of section 12.140 This
author suggests, however, that the court's detailed recital of Goldman's
actions does not comport with the conclusion that Goldman exceeded
his professional role. That his involvement in the scheme is pervasive
does not belya contrary view. Goldman was neither an executive of
the corporation nor a controlling stockholder. His only apparent finan338. 399 F. Supp. at 1369-70. Compare the role of attorney-director Levy in SEC
v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975), discussed at notes 21019 supra and accompanying text.
339. 399 F. Supp. at 1336-37.
340. Id. at 1337-39. Goldman acted as authorized representative of two individuals
then in control of the corporation in negotiations which led to a transfer of control
to an outside group which had acquired a considerable number of shares. Id.
341. Id. at 1369.

342. Id. at 1338, 1346, 1369.
343. Id. at 1344-45, 1369.
344. Id. at 1345-46, 1369.
345. Id. at 1369. The citation to Black & Co. v. Nova-Tech, Inc. appears to be
implied recognition of the distinction between participation for venue/jurisdictional
purposes and ultimate liability under section 12(1). See note 337 supra.
346. 399 F. Supp. at 1369.
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cial interest was in his legal fees. 47 All ministerial acts were at the
direction of the main defendants and none would seem to depart from
the rubric of legal representation by corporate counsel.3 4 8 The court
does suggest that Goldman, together with two control persons, "planned
and controlled" the corporation's destiny.3 49 Yet, there is no evidence
that Goldman's influence derived from other than his role as legal adviser, whose views were well received.3 50 It is difficult to square the
court's conclusion with the fact that shortly after Goldman's issuance
of the opinion letter he was summarily dismissed as corporate counsel
without notice .3 5s Furthermore, as pointed out above, Goldman was
out of the picture before the negotiations which eventually led to the
transaction with Wassel.
The case therefore illustrates the trend toward attorney liability as
a "seller" under section 12 where he is substantially involved in the
events culminating in an illegal transaction and is aware that his activities are integral to the scheme. The fact that counsel acts solely in
his professional capacity and is insulated from the solicitation effort will
not be determinative because, as the court in Wassel observed,
"[one's] conduct as a member of the bar may in an important sense
pose more danger to our societal needs than the conduct of [the
principals] .352
2.

Aiding and Abetting

Along with the trend toward expanding the participant doctrine
under section 12 to include attorneys acting within their professional
role as "key persons" in a distribution scheme, there appears to be
movement along a second front. Recent cases suggest that secondary
liability may arise from aiding and abetting participants in an unlawful
or fraudulent securities transaction. 8 3
The significance of this trend for the potential liability of attorneys
347. Goldman's fee was fixed by agreement not to exceed $15,000. Id. at 1338.
348. To conclude otherwise would be to ignore the broad spectrum of activities which
are acknowledged to come within the charge of attorneys who represent public corporations. See generally KNEPPER, supranote 11, at 285-87.
349. 399 F. Supp. at 1346.
350. Goldman gained his position by virtue of his acquaintance with Steckerl, president of the corporation. Steckerl was ultimately unseated by the rival group. Id. at
1337-39.
351. Id. at 1341.
352. Id. at 1366.
353. See In re Caesars Palace Sec. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366, 378-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), and authorities cited therein.
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Schiffman, the attorney in

Spectrum, authored an opinion letter on the assertedly exempt status
35 5
of the proposed distribution of securities issued pursuant to a merger.
Schiffman's involvement, when compared to Goldman's in Wassel v.
Eglowsky, was minimal, although his opinion letter was equally critical
to the scheme and his knowledge of the significant events was consid-

erable. The Commission alleged both theories: participation as a
statutory underwriter and aiding and abetting the illegal distribution of
Spectrum stock. To have held Schiffman to be a direct participant
would have been the farthest reaching decision among the lawyer-asparticipant cases discussed above.3 50 Not only was Schiffman's conduct
strictly within the bounds of his legal practice, his position as outside
legal consultant was quite remote. Unlike Goldman in Wessel v.
Eglowsky, Schiffman did not participate in the preparation of the overall
redistribution plan. Thus, the Second Circuit declined to reach the issue
of Schiffman's primary liability as participant. 57 Instead, it was held
that Schiffman's issuance of an erroneous opinion letter with knowledge
that it could be used to facilitate the distribution of the subject securities by providing needed assurance to prospective purchasers that the
offering was exempt from registration constituted aiding and abetting
in violation of section 5.358 Arguably, a finding of aiding and abetting
liability in enforcement actions directly under section 5 should not
necessarily be determinative in a civil liability context.359 Yet, the growing acceptance of the doctrine of secondary liability in disputes between
private litigants suggests a contrary view might prevail.3 60
354. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973), discussed earlier in reference to a differential
standard of culpability in SEC enforcement actions under section 10(b). See notes
195-209 supra and accompanying text.
355. 489 F.2d at 537-39.
356. See notes 311-52 supra and accompanying text.
357. 489 F.2d at 541 n.11.
358. Accord, SEC v. Universal Major Indus. Corp., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1195,804 (2d Cir. 1976); SEC v. Galaxy Foods, 417 F. Supp. 1225, 1242
(E.D.N.Y. 1976); SEC v. Century Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,232 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Empowered with broad enforcement powers, the Commission must proceed directly under section 5. Section 12 is
reserved for vindication of the rights of purchasers of the subject securities. See notes
320-22 supra and accompanying text.
359. See Loss, supra note 289, at 1716.
-360. See, e.g., Adams v. Standard Knitting Mills, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) f 95,683 (E.D. Tenn. 1976); Lorber v. Beebe, 407 F. Supp. 279, 287-88 & n.6
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Sandusky Land, Ltd. v. Uniplan Groups, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 440, 444
(N.D. Ohio 1975); B & B Inv. Club v. Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720, 725-26 (E.D.
Pa. 1975) (dictum); In re Caesars Palace See. Litigation, 360 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.
1973). See also Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341 (2d
Cir. 1973), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 926 (1977). See note 353 supra and accompanying text.
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Where the standard of culpability is negligence with respect to the
attorney's opinion 3 61 and knowledge of the plan for distribution of un-

registered securities and the probability that the opinion will facilitate
that effort, the effect of secondary liability may be tantamount to an
abandonment of the seller requirement of section 12.

While this is

not to ignore the shift in the burden of proof to the purchaser who
alleges secondary liability in lieu of participation under section
12(2),31 1 or the requirement of culpability (negligence) in contrast to
liability without fault under section 12(1), it does suggest an expanded
scope of liability beyond that intended by the drafters of the 1933

Act.80 3 The theory of secondary liability under section 12 is recent in
origin and the elements of aiding and abetting have not yet been

spelled out, 364 but the decision in Spectrum does not bode well for the
position of attorneys as counselors in the sale of securities.
B.

Section 11 of the SecuritiesAct of 1933

1. Scope of Liability Under Section 11
Section 11 of the 1933 Act also involves a measure of coordinate
Aiding and abetting liability was rejected under section 12(1) in Kobil v. Forsberg,
389 F. Supp. 715, 718 (W.D. Pa. 1975), where defendant had no connection with the
illegal sale but was alleged to have participated in the subsequent cover-up. The court's
statements do not suggest a blanket rejection of secondary liability under 12.
Less equivocal in its rejection of the use of aiding and abetting to circumvent the
statutory limits on the scope of liability under section 11 and 12 was the court in In re
Equity Funding Corp. of America Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161 (C.D. Cal. 1976):
This court is of the opinion that where a statute specifically limits those who may
be held liable for the conduct described by the statute, the courts cannot extend liability, under a theory of aiding and abetting, to those who do not fall within the
categories of potential defendants described by the statute. To impose such liability
would circumvent the express intent of Congress in enacting these statutes that proscribe narrowly defined conduct and allow relief from precisely defined parties.
Id. at 181.
361. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. Century
Inv. Transfer Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. Sec. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,232
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
362. Primary liability under section 12(2) is incurred where the "seller" fails to sustain a due diligence defense, see note 288 supra and accompanying text, whereas a
claim of aiding and abetting would require the purchaser to carry the full burden of
proof on all elements, including culpable negligence. See Loss, supra note 289, at 1716.
363. Professor Bromberg, in discussing what he terms "the development of looser concepts like those recognized for Rule 10b-5," BROMBERG, supra note 94, § 8.5(315), suggests
[a] conceptual barrier to the adoption of aiding and abetting and conspiracy
notions for §12(2) is that the provision merely imposes a liability. It does not
(like SA §17(a) or Rule lOb-5) define a violation or make an act unlawful.
Aiding-abetting and conspiracy, with their criminal origins, are more comfortable
to a violation section than to an express liability section.
Id.
364. See cases cited note 360 supra.
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liability with respect to the broad antifraud proscription in rule
1Ob-5. 65 Section 11 creates a private right of action for damages for
purchasers when a registration statement includes untrue statements of
material facts or fails to state material facts necessary to preserve the
accuracy of statements which do appear in the document. Within the
carefully limited scope of section 11, Congress expressly identified the
potential defendant classes and provided for differential standards of
culpability as to each class.
With a view to potential liability of attorneys under section 11, two
factors are important. First, the scope of potential defendant classes
does not expressly include attorneys. Liability is limited to the issuer,
signatories to the registration statement, corporate directors (or partners), underwriters and "experts."3' 6 6 Most certainly, attorneys will be
exposed to liability when they act in a dual capacity, such as corporate
director. Moreover, as suggested by the experience of the attorneydirectors in the two leading cases, Escott v. BarChris Construction
Corp.3 6 7 and Felt v. Leasca Data Processing Equipment Corp.,36 8 the
standard of liability-failure of due diligence-will be flexibly applied
according to the defendant's degree of involvement, his expertise, and
his access to information and data which, in practical effect, will impose
greater demands on the attorney-director by virtue of his special expertise in matters of securities law. 69 The only potential exposure for attorneys' fulfilling their professional role lies in the category of experts
named in the registration statement as having prepared or certified portions of the necessary documentation. This will be considered below.
The second factor involves the standard of liability. In contrast to
the scientor standard of culpability now held to govern actions under
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, negligence is the measure of liability
under section 11.370 As with section 12(2), 3 7 1 the burden lies with
365. See notes 272-83 supra and accompanying text.
366. Securities Act of 1933 § 11(a) (1)-(5), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (1)-(5) (1970).
367. 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
368. 332 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y. 1971)
369. See generally Folk, Civil Liabilities Under the Federal Securities Acts: The
BarChrisCase, 55 VA. L. REv. 1 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Folk]; KNEPPER, supra note
11, at 243-56, 289-91; Note, "BarChris" and the Securities Acts: Practical Responses
for Attorneys, 10 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 360 (1969); Note, Escott v. BarChris:
"Reasonable Investigation" and Prospectus Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities
Act of 1933, 82 HAgv.L. REV. 908 (1969); Comment, "Due Diligence" and the Expert
in Corporate SecuritiesRegistrations,42 S. CAL. L. REv. 293 (1969).
370. The only exception is the strict liability imposed on the issuer. Securities Act
of 1933 § 11(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b) (1970).
371. See text accompanying note 288 supra.
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the defendant to establish his due diligence. 1 7 2 This is a significant
concession to those aggrieved purchasers who can state a claim within
the limited perimeters of section 11. Therefore, it may be expected
that pressure will be exerted upon the meaning of expert liability for
misstatements in registration statements.
2.

Attorneys as Experts

It should be said at the outset that the significance of the potential
liability of an attorney as an expert lies not only in avoidance of the
more rigorous burden of proving scienter under section 10(b). That
liability may also be an alternative ground where the "seller" requirement
proves a fatal obstacle to a successful claim under section 12(2) which
is an overlapping liability provision for misstatements in the registration
statement. 7 3
Section 11 (a) (4) provides for liability in negligence for
every accountant, engineer, or appraiser, or any person whose profession gives authority to a statement made by him, who has with his consent been named as having prepared or certified any part of the registration statement, or as having prepared or certified any report or
valuation which is used in connection with the registration statement,
with respect to the statement in such registration statement, report, or
valuation, which purports to have been prepared or certified by
him . ... 374
It is clear from the statute that liability may only be imposed with
respect to those portions attributable to the expert3 75 where he fails to
demonstrate that he exercised due diligence in the investigation upon
which his judgment is based and that he reasonably believed the truthfulness of his statements as of the effective date of the registration
statement.3 76 It is also a condition to liability as an expert that such
person consent to being named in the registration statement as having
prepared or certified the pertinent portion.3
372. See note 278 supra and accompanying text.
373. Section 12(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970) is considerably
broader in scope than section 11 in that it (1) imposes liability for oral misstatements
made in the sale of the subject security, (2) is not limited to defects present on the
effective date, see SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972),
and (3) is not limited to registered securities.
374. Securities Act of 1933 § 11 (a) (4), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (4) (1970).
375. It is also necessary that the registration statement incorporate a fair and accurate representation of the expert's report, valuation or other statement. See Securities
Actof 1933 § 11(b)(3)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(ii) (1970).
376. See Securities Act of 1933 § 11(b)(3)(B)(i), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(b)(3)(B)(i)
(1970).
377. See Securities Act of 1933 H9 11(a)(4), 1l(b)(3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a)(4),
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Most commentators agree that an attorney can acquire the status of
an expert provided the statutory conditions are met,87 8 although there

are no reported instances of such liability.3m

On the other hand, it

is clear that an attorney who drafts the registration statement does not

thereby render himself accountable as having expertised the entire
document, unless, of course, in addition he occupies a dual role as

director. 8 0 Attorney-expert liability would most conceivably lie in the
preparation of formal opinion letters appearing as exhibits in the
registration statement.38 '
To the extent that formal opinions of counsel come within the scope
of section 11, the due diligence standard appears comparable to the
77k(b) (3) (B) (1970). The written consent must be filed along with the registration
statement. Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970). The SEC's rules
on consents are set forth in Commission rules 435-39, 17 C.F.R. § 230.435-.439 (1976).
378. See, e.g., Folk, supra note 369, at 58; Lipman, supra note 10, at 463; Shipman,
supra note 10, at 236-37, 264; Small, supra note 10, at 1192-94; Wheat, Professional
Responsibility-The CorporateBar, INsT. OF Sac. REG. 213, 217 (1973).
379. There is some question whether counsel can provide qualified consent to the
incorporation of their legal opinions in the registration statement without becoming experts. It is a common practice for counsel to provide such consent with the additional
qualification that in so doing the attorney does not admit to being an expert under
section 11. See C. IsRAELs & G. DUFF, JR., WHEN CORPORATIONS GO PUBLIC 25051 (1962).
380. The contrary argument was advanced in BarChris. The district court rejected
it, saying:
The defendants do not agree among themselves as to who the "experts" were or
as to the parts of the registration statement which were expertised. Some defendants say that Peat, Marwick was the expert, others say that BarChris's attorneys
. . . and the underwriters' attorneys . . . were also the experts. On the first view,
only those portions of the registration statement purporting to be made on Peat,
Marwick's authority were expertised portions. On the other view, everything in the
registration statement was within this category, because the two law firms were responsible for the entire document.
The first view is the correct one. To say that the entire registration statement
is expertised because some lawyer prepared it would be an unreasonable construction of the statute. Neither the lawyer for the company nor the lawyer for the
underwriters is an expert within the meaning of Section 11.
Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 683 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
381. This would primarily involve an attorney opinion on legality of the proposed
issue as required by the Securities Act of 1933 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 77g (1970) and Schedule
A, 1 29, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(29) (1970). For various' forms prescribed by the SEC for
the registration of securities which require such opinion of counsel, see, e.g., Form S-I,
2 Fan. Sac. L. REP. (CCH) 1 7128 (1976); Form S-2, id. f 7147; Form S-3, id.
7157; Form S-4, id. 7167; Form S-5, id. 1 7177; Form S-6, id. 1 7187; Form S-7, id. 1
7196; Form S-8, id. 1[ 7202; Form S-10, id. 7222; Form S-11, id. 7239; Form S-12,
id. 7256; Form S-13, id. 7265; Form S-14, id. ff 7276; Form S-16, id. 17295.
It is also common for corporate counsel to be requested, by the underwriter or others,
to author a legal opinion on other aspects of the proposed offering, such as tax consequences, the status of the issuer's title to material properties, or certain contingent liabilities including pending litigation. Where properly incorporated in the registration statement, such opinions would probably qualify counsel as an expert under section 11.
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duty of care imposed by the common law on attorneys with respect to
services performed on behalf of the client. There are, however, two
important differences where section 11 imposes a greater burden on
corporate counsel. First, due diligence is an affirmative defense to be
asserted by the defendant attorney in order to avoid liability for an
erroneous expert statement.3 82 The purchaser of the security need
only go forward in establishing his standing and the requisite misstatement. Second, the scope of liability is widened to include all persons
purchasing securities covered by the defective registration statement
despite the absence of a foreseeable relationship.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Unquestionably, the impact of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5, the
most influential and potentially flexible instruments for the develop-

ment of standards of liability for attorneys under the securities laws,
will be substantially reduced by the Supreme Court's decision in Hochfelder barring private damage actions based on negligence.3 83 Nonetheless, vast areas of uncertainty remain, including the role of duty
analysis for secondary liability, the requisite standard of liability in SEC
enforcement actions, and the scope of attorney liability under the
Securities Act of 1933.
While the trend moves steadily toward increased exposure of securities
lawyers in their professional role, the greatest cause for concern is the
sheer uncertainty. Certainly, the legal profession is capable of adjusting its standard of conduct to clear rules of liability. The immediate
need is for concerted involvement of the Court, the Commission and
the Congress in resolving these questions.

382. See Small, supra note 10, at 1194-95.
383. Id.

